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Why do existing political violence groups become affiliates of a parent organization? 
Previous literature regarding alliances in civil conflicts has often focused on these relationships 
horizontally, in which all groups are equal.  Often importance is placed on only the number of 
factions involved overall.  However, my research demonstrates the utilization of affiliation as a 
signal. Groups can utilize their relationship with a parent organization in order to bring in new 
resources.    
Parent organizations are often better known with an established “brand” which supporters 
follow.  For example, al-Qaeda has cultivated a jihadist brand which attracts followers 
worldwide.  When lesser-known groups affiliate with a parent organization, the audience of that 
parent organizations can divert valuable resources, such as fighters or additional financing, to 
affiliate groups because they know the group follows the same brand.  Yet the costs of affiliation 
remain very high as affiliated groups increase the potential for counter-insurgency operations 
once they increase their profile by aligning with a well-known parent organization. I establish 
that affiliation can be used as a credible signal when costs of subsequent counterinsurgency are 
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high enough to demonstrate a group’s loyalty to their parent’s goals.  The audience is then 
willing to give resources to groups who prove their commitment by risking affiliation.   
Utilizing a formal model, a large-scale randomized survey experiment conducted in 
Pakistan and India (n ~ 1,000), and statistical analysis with a novel dataset I coded consisting of 
all South Asian political violence groups and their alliances (n  = 367), I establish that affiliation 
can be used as a credible signal when costs of subsequent counterinsurgency are high enough to 
demonstrate a group’s loyalty to their parent’s goals.  The audience is then willing to give 
resources to groups who prove their commitment by risking affiliation.  This line of research 
expands on a new dynamic in the alliance literature. When forming alliances, groups can 
leverage the vertical nature of their relationship with a parent organization in order to bring 
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 The benefits of alliances among political violence groups can be far-reaching1.  From 
overcoming collective action issues, to training, military, and financial benefits, to increased 
negotiation power, groups stand to gain greatly from these arrangements.  Of course, the 
downsides include the costs of internal discord, the difficulties in negotiating and dividing up 
winnings amongst disparate groups, as well as the potential for rivalries. These potential costs 
and benefits are most often conceptualized among horizontal alliances, in which groups are on 
equal footing.  Yet, when examining the depth of ties among these alliances, we observe a new 
set of dynamics within these relationships. Rather than horizontal relationships in which all 
groups are thought of as equals, groups can affiliate with a parent organization in a more vertical 
alignment in which one group holds a clear parent organization role.2  Taking into account both 
the costs and benefits these relationships possess, I develop a theory of vertical alliances to 
explain why political violence groups choose to affiliate with a parent organization.3  Taking into 
account the high costs of affiliation which can serve as a signal of commitment to the parent 
organization’s cause, I find these affiliate groups can ultimately bring in benefits from members 
of the parent organization’s support base. 
The group al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) highlights these dynamics.  The group paid great costs 
upon pledging but were willing to risk these in order to gain increased sources of support for 
their cause. Before founding AQI, a branch of Osama bin Laden’s core al-Qaeda group, Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian who fought on the side of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan as 
 
1 Political violence groups include terrorists, rebels, and militias 
2 The terms pledge, align, and affiliate are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation 
3 This theory accounts for the decision of the affiliate groups to pledge and the corresponding support they can 
receive. For research on the specific decisions of parent organizations to seek out pledges or not, see section 1.3.4  
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they resisted the Soviets in the 1980’s. Forced out of Afghanistan following the US-led invasion, 
al-Zarqawi moved to Iraq, founding Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) in 2001.  Surviving the 
US invasion of Iraq in 2003, JTJ led an insurgency effort, successfully uniting Iraqi Sunnis 
against the US coalition.  JTJ accomplished remarkable feats compared to other insurgency 
groups in Iraq, effectively using the internet to spread their message and recruit fighters and 
utilizing violent methods such as suicide bombing and proving to be a real thorn in the side of 
the US.  Still, with the coalition’s attention split between five local Iraqi insurgency groups, JTJ 
operated in relative safety (Hashim 2014). 
However, despite a relatively successful insurgency, al-Zarqawi and JTJ still formally 
pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda in October of 2004, creating AQI.  
Expanding their goals to be more transnational in nature—attacking western infidels and Muslim 
apostates and re-creating the Islamic Caliphate—catapulted AQI to the top of the coalition’s 
counter-terrorism list.  Yet, the base of support for AQI continued to grow.  Disgruntled Sunnis 
in Iraq and beyond continued to provide increasing sanctuaries, resources, and fighters for AQI. 
They trusted AQI as a group committed to the al-Qaeda cause.  Still, in the end al-Zarqawi was 
specifically targeted and killed in a drone strike June, 2006.  The US surge of troops in 2007 
directed much of its force against AQI and its supporters (Hashim 2014).  By the end of 2008, 
AQI was initially defeated, their Sunni base of support was left in ruins and the coalition troops 
began pulling out of Iraq (Fishman 2008). 
The case of AQI underscores the apparent paradox of affiliation. Why do existing 
political violence groups become affiliates of a parent organization? This pattern of alignment 
among political violence groups, in which one group is the clear parent organization, has been 
observed among many types of political violence groups – from terrorist, to rebels, to militias. 
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Yet, this affiliation is puzzling.  When these lesser-known groups align with a well-known parent 
organization, they now draw the same counter-political violence attention of the national or 
international community which is already committed to stopping the parent organization. Why 
would groups risk this increased chance of a crackdown and their ultimate demise?  
While alignment from the parent organization’s perspective and alliances in general have 
been studied, the incentives of potential affiliate groups to purposefully align with the “brand” of 
a parent organization remains an understudied, yet important part of the civil conflict literature.4  
These affiliations are often lumped into the general alliance literature, with the sum of the groups 
studied as one unit.  Even disaggregated literature on the fragmentation of movements still 
focuses on the ability of the unit as a whole to fight and bargain with the state in civil wars or on 
the resources groups can exchange between one another in the terrorism literature.  
I instead present a vertical theory of affiliation in which the better-known brand of the 
parent organization draws in affiliates, specifically because of these high costs.  Groups can use 
the cost associated with a potential crackdown after their affiliation as a credible signal to 
potential supporters.  Affiliates can risk this crackdown to prove their loyalty to the parent 
organization’s expanded goals and ultimately gain resources from this broader base of supporters 
who follow the parent organization because they know they are supporting committed groups. 
1.1 THE PUZZLE OF AFFILIATION  
Affiliation with a parent organization is not a pattern we should expect to widely observe, 
because of the backlash associated with it.  Yet, it has proven to be a persistent phenomenon 
across political violence groups.  For example, a parent organization such as al-Qaeda has drawn 
 
4 I utilize the term “brand” as a short-hand term for the ideology or set of expanded goals the parent organization 
cultivates in order to secure a broad base of support. It is not meant to be interpreted in the context of marketing or 
other business literature. 
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multiple affiliate groups spanning from Africa to Asia, all of whom fight for al-Qaeda’s jihadist 
goals in their own respective regions (Hoffman 2018). As of 2015, 74 entities have pledged 
allegiance to al-Qaeda or ISIL, despite active counterterrorism efforts specifically aimed at 
curving pledging.  Indeed, from the above example, affiliates of al-Qaeda are subjected to 
mandatory sanctions by all UN member states, including travel bans and financial freezes (1267 
Sanctions List 2015).   
Beyond terrorism, other types of groups affiliate with parent organizations as well, 
despite domestic or international backlash.  Within civil wars, rebel groups have often aligned 
under the flag of one central group.  For example, Colonel Riad al-Asaad formed the Free Syrian 
Army in 2011 and soon began seeking affiliate groups to join (BBC 2013).  Immediately, these 
aligned groups became the center-piece of the pro-Syrian coalition’s counter-insurgency efforts. 
Instead of forming an alignment amongst rebel groups, some groups instead align with 
the government as a militia.  In the 1965 Kashmir War, the Razakar and Mujahid militias that 
existed in the Pakistani-aligned region of Kashmir became affiliates of the Pakistani government, 
using the militias as the majority of their troops.  Yet, Pakistan has denied formal ties with the 
militia, publicly supporting the Indian troop’s counterstrikes and UN intervention against the 
militias (Kapur & Gaguly 2012).   
The examples above highlight this alignment puzzle.  In each case, groups align with a 
parent organization and come under attack. As evidenced with AQI, al-Zarqawi had safely made 
it through two wars (Afghanistan and the initial US invasion) and JTJ was successfully operating 
as an insurgency and terrorist group in Iraq, yet they still pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, 
bringing the backlash of the US-led coalition squarely upon them.  Why would a group and its 
5 
 
supporters risk the backlash associated with becoming an affiliate of a well-established parent-
organization, drawing the counter-extremist efforts of a wider community? 
1.2 THEORETICAL OVERVIEW: WHY AFFILIATE? 
To answer this over-arching question, I have developed a formal model in which groups 
pledge allegiance to a parent-organization based on considerations of their own goals, the 
alignment of their goals with their potential expanded audience, and anticipation of the 
crackdowns they will experience.  Political violence groups can use a pledge as a costly signal 
that they are willing to incur these risks in order to get support from a broader audience, pulled 
from the base of the parent organization.   
The better-known parent organization generally has a broad base of supporters who 
follow the brand of the parent organization.  For example, al-Qaeda has a worldwide network of 
supporters who are drawn to their Salafi jihadist ideology.  This base audience has resources that 
it can potentially send to groups, such as fighters or finances, once they affiliate with the brand 
of the parent organization.  However, this base audience only wants to send these resources to 
groups who are truly aligned with the parent organization’s goals.  They want these resources to 
promote the goals which drew them to the parent organization’s ideology in the first place.  
Thus, an ideal affiliate group will have these expanded goals which align with the parent 
organization’s goals, rather than pursuing their own, localized set of goals.   
The audience knows groups have an incentive to bluff about their goals to get resources, 
though.  Affiliation serves as a costly signal of a group’s commitment to the expanded set of 
goals of the parent organization.  Pledging allegiance gives information about the group’s type – 
or whether they will pursue the parent organization’s goals or not.  Groups need to signal to 
potential supporters because of the low information arena within which they operate.   
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Pledging is a way to communicate this information.  It is a costly signal because once 
affiliated, the profile of the group raises.  This opens them up to the national or international 
crackdown, already experienced by the parent organization.  For example, by pledging allegiance 
to al-Qaeda, terrorist groups know they will have an increased risk of backlash—such as drone 
strikes, ground troop attacks or disrupted finances—from the international community 
committed to eradicating terrorism.  
Thus, only groups willing to pursue the parent organization’s expanded set of goals 
should be the type willing to send this signal and affiliate.  When this signal is received by the 
parent organization’s broader audience, these supporters can send them resources, knowing they 
are most likely supporting loyal affiliates.  Because potential supporters want to back a capable, 
driven group, affiliation serves as a way to gain support and increase a group’s resources from a 
new, broader pool of supporters.  AQI, for example, risked the costs of affiliation with al-Qaeda 
and in turn received increased support from al-Qaeda’s base of supporters world-wide post-
pledging. Post-pledge, bin Laden even released a statement asking for support to flow to AQI, 
proclaiming "We ask God to accept this unity and bless it and for all to know, the dear mujahed 
brother Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is the prince of al Qaeda in Iraq, so we ask all our organization 
brethren to listen to him and obey him in his good deeds” (CNN 2004).  In turn, after AQI 
proved their dedication by risking the backlash of the international community within Iraq, 
supporters of the broader al-Qaeda base sent resources to AQI including foreign fighters and 
increased financial support. 
In sum, I argue that political violence groups can affiliate with a parent organization in 
order to secure new support from that organization’s audience.  Parent organizations are often 
better known with an established brand which supporters follow.  When lesser-known groups 
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affiliate with a parent organization, the audience of that parent organizations can divert valuable 
resources, such as fighters or additional financing, to affiliate groups because they know the 
group follows the same brand.  
Yet the costs of affiliation remain very high as affiliated groups increase the potential for 
counter-insurgency operations once they increase their profile by aligning with a well-known 
parent organization.  I establish that affiliation can be used as a credible signal when costs of 
subsequent counterinsurgency are high enough to demonstrate a group’s loyalty to their parent’s 
goals.  The audience is then willing to give resources to groups who prove their commitment by 
risking affiliation.   
1.3 EXIGENT LITERATURE  
1.3.1 Alignment and Alliances in Other Literature 
International relations has long sought to answer why states form formal alliances.  
Liberals and constructivists argue similarities in domestic politics of states can result in long 
lasting, sustained cooperation between states (Lake 1996).  Realists, on the other hand, widely 
view alliances as a means to pursue interests.  They are temporary aggregations of capabilities in 
order to increase security against a common enemy.  When the threat passes, the alliance is no 
longer need (Morgenthau 1973; Waltz 1979).  Powell (1991) argues that states can in fact use 
alliances as a foreign policy tool.  In exchange for protection, weaker states will make 
concessions to stronger states with a common threat.  Leaders can further utilize alliances to 
provide credible information to other states about the likelihood of intervention (Morrow 1994; 
Fearon 1997). 
The effects of alliances among states vary widely depending on the type of alliance.  
Defensive alliances, in which a state guarantees intervention if an ally is invaded, successfully 
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serve as a deterrent threat. However, offensive alliances, in which a state agrees to join an attack 
against a mutual target, and promises of non-intervention, have a negative effect, leading to 
increased conflict.  These types prove to increase the confidence of a challenger that they will 
succeed with aggression (Leeds 2003).  Though they can bring insights, the scale international 
alliances among states often cannot map onto sub-national alliances due to the sovereignty and 
formality of state alliances.   
Sub-national groups outside have also long sought alliances.  Unlike other political 
violence groups, gangs are generally more profit-guided than guided by a goal of overthrowing 
the existing regime or claiming territory of their own.  They wish to co-opt existing institutions, 
rather than subvert them to create their own institution (Osorio 2013).  Reasons gangs seek to 
expand by taking on affiliate groups include reducing geographic distance from drug suppliers 
and consumers, accessing international supply routes, and responding to shifts in the domestic 
policies of drug importers (Kalyvas 2015). Democratization is often cited as a cause of 
expansion.  Democracies tend to more actively counter gang activity, destroying patronage 
systems and upsetting the low-level violence equilibrium, opening the door to growth (Villarreal 
2002).   
Gangs have also relied on the marginalization of immigrants to expand into new areas.  
For example, MS-13 originated in Los Angeles.  They have had ties to El Salvador from their 
onset.  MS-13 gave opportunities to these immigrants that they otherwise would not have had, 
ultimately setting an example of how gangs could be run effectively. The deportation of 
Salvadorans from America led to former members joining existing Salvadoran gangs (pandillas) 
and eventually aligning these gangs with the MS-13 parent organization, seen as the ideal 
(Decker et al 2009; Cruz 2007).   
9 
 
Social movements have further built transnational ties through alignment.  Activists can 
learn from one another outside of formal channels, exchanging best practices, engaging in 
leadership brokering and developing transnational public spheres, such as conferences. Bounded 
by limited financial resources and political constraints, transnational social movements can bond 
together in order to form new world policy.  For example, states wishing to lobby the World 
Trade Organization will form alignments in order to adopt the best frame of the social issue 
possible (Bandy & Smith 2004). 
Domestically, political parties represent an environment ripe with alliance dynamics.  
Within the United States, we often see legislators reach across party lines to co-sponsor a bill 
with a member of the opposite part in order to avoid having to wrangle members within the rank 
and file of their own party.  Parliamentary systems are further built on the premise of coalition 
building.  Parties must bargain and build their alliances in order to get and maintain power.  In 
the face of defection from any given party, coalitions must build their alliance with the goal of a 
long-lasting party dynamic that can stand up to the opposition.  Both of these cases represent 
how internal contests can be influenced by external sources. 
1.3.2 Group Level: Why Political Violence Groups Form Alliances 
 Within the political violence literature, specifically, much work has explored why these 
groups join forces.  The civil war literature has focused on horizontal alliances among rebel 
groups.  The main arguments presented focus on collective action problems and material 
interests. The terrorism literature, on the other hand, has focused specifically on affiliation with a 
parent organization, mainly al-Qaeda.  The militia literature has widely focused on the incentives 




Collective Action Problems 
Groups can horizontally align to overcome inherent collective action problems.  In arenas 
in which several groups are interested in achieving the same goal, there exists a collective action 
problem that must be surmounted.  If the outcome of a conflict is a public good, then groups 
have the incentive to free-ride (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Lichbach 1998).  One way to 
overcome this is selective incentives.  For example, in civil wars, rebels often have great 
potential to loot, as evidenced in the opportunistic “greed” literature (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). 
Yet, there is also a security dilemma among groups that ally – today’s ally may be 
tomorrow’s enemy.  While this can lead to issues of instability, coordination and cooperation, the 
generation of competition within alliances also allows groups to overcome this collective action 
problem (Zeigler 2013).  Because of this mutual suspicion among groups in a coalition—that 
they may have to one day fight one another—groups are incentivized to be as capable as their 
partners.  They must be ready today to fight their partner tomorrow.   This preparedness in the 
wake of a potential coalition collapse results in groups’ participation both in the alliance 
formation and fighting.   
Bapat and Bond (2012) argue that state sponsors can also help overcome this 
commitment problem.  A rebel group can gain security from a state patron, while improving their 
capabilities and lowering the costs of a civil war.  A state sponsor can further coordinate among 
rebel alliances, controlling supplies and punishing defectors (Byman 2005).  In return, rebel 
groups must give up decision-making autonomy.  Still, for many rebel groups, this coordination 
of cooperation among rebel groups proves to be worth it, especially for rebel groups facing a 




 These arguments assume the critical goal of a rebel group is power.  They want to survive 
and ultimately achieve postwar power.  In general, rebel groups have long engaged in “rebel 
diplomacy,” seeking political or material advantages from abroad.  This comes in the form of 
visibility, credibility, and acceptance on the world stage (Huang 2016).  Rebel groups often seek 
external state support as a means to achieve this (Salehyan 2011).  However, these dynamics also 
exist internally. 
Within horizontal alliances, Christia (2012) argues they follow a minimum winning 
coalition (MWC) logic.  Groups balance entering an alliance that is large enough to win, but 
small enough to ensure that they receive the greatest possible spoils after winning. If the MWC is 
passed, groups will find another alliance to join. Thus, it is the relative power between rebel 
groups within an alliance, rather than more normative factors such as identity, that drives the 
formation and fractionalization of rebel alliances. 
Ideology 
Ideology is a source of collective identity. This identity can be focused around ideals 
such as Marxism, nationalism, religion, or ethnicity. Ideology forges alliances by bringing group 
cohesion, letting the soldiers know the cause and objectives. Gade et al. (2019) argue ideology 
forms the key aspect in choosing alliance partners, under considerations of conflict 
framing, conception of the ideal polity, and territorial aspiration. 
Terrorism 
Cooperative Relationships 
Cooperation among terrorist groups is rarer, given the clandestine nature of terrorist 
groups.  An alliance has the potential to open up operational vulnerabilities as the scope of 
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efforts and communications increases.  Yet, the benefits remain great - operational effectiveness, 
greater range and efficiency of attacks, and the opportunity to enhance legitimacy by increasing 
the overall stature of the cause. 
Rather than mere material incentives, though, these alliances generally necessitate a 
clearly shared ideology and/or shared enemies.  These shared features tend to generate hubs, 
which serve as a central point for organizational adaptation and learning. Under this theory, 
young groups or groups in a rapidly changing conflict environment tend to be the most 
vulnerable, and thus the most in need of an alliance (Bacon 2018). When distinguishing between 
cooperative alliances and rivalry relationships, Phillips (2018) finds distinguishing features that 
align with this notion.  Cooperation tends to exist among groups fighting for territory or religious 
change.   
Industrial Organizational Psychology   
The terrorism literature has also explicitly examined why groups align with a parent 
organization (al-Qaeda, in particular) utilizing I/O psychology.  Groups are able to gain a 
comparative advantage, with different groups offering different expertise and local knowledge.  
They can also expand the scale and scope of operations.  Delegating duties takes the burden off 
of the parent organization.  They also add new “customers and products” by expanding and can 
promote organizational learning, resulting in greater payoffs at a lower cost. The greatest benefit 
to groups pledging, though, is joining the brand of al-Qaeda (Byman 2014).  It is recognized 
worldwide.  Being part of al-Qaeda generates exposure and a legitimization for these individual 
groups that is difficult to garner on their own. 
Groups must also attempt to mitigate the risks of merging, however (Mendelsohn 2011).  
The exposure affiliates gain from pledging comes a great cost.  It creates a need to balance local 
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goals, such as the insurgency in Iraq, with the parent organization’s more transnational goals, 
such as attacking western targets and reestablishing the Caliphate (Loidolt 2011).  Also, 
increased counterterrorism pressure almost always follows post-pledging.  They target 
communications, finances and members of the group.  This makes operating immensely more 
difficult and increases the probability that group members will be directly targeted and arrested 
or killed, such as the case with AQI (Byman 2014).  Of course, this overarching theory could be 
applied to all type of political violence groups. 
 Yet, this theory remains incomplete when translated to political violence groups.  Perhaps 
most glaring is the starting foundation in the business literature, that firms aim to be profit 
maximizing, does not uniformly apply. The goals of many political violence groups, on the other 
hand, is often to bring about political change, no matter the cost.  While they may want to 
promote efficiency or global-reach, they do not have to same fundamental profit-seeking 
calculation mechanism as a business firm (Byman 2014). 
1.3.3 Effects of Alliances among Political Violence Groups 
 Beyond why groups align, there is a large literature on under what conditions political 
violence groups form alliances and what are the observable implications of joining forces.  Most 
studies have focused on the absolute number of allies an actor has or the number of groups 
within a movement, though.5  By tacitly assuming an equal relationship among groups, this body 
of literature misses the effects caused by alignment with a parent organization, specifically. 
Rebel Groups 
Though early literature often conceptualized rebel group alliances as a unitary actor 
fighting against the government, more recent studies have focused on the disaggregation of these 
 
5 Horowitz and Potter (2014) are a notable exception 
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alliances to allow for different capabilities and preferences.  Two separate sets of effects have 
stemmed from this line of research.  First, answering what are the effects of have multiple rebel 
groups within a movement.  These fragmentation arguments focus not on direct alliances, but 
more simply on multiple groups fighting for the same movement’s cause. 
Fragmentation leading to civil war has been a key finding in the literature.  Under a 
bargaining framework, movements that experience fragmentation have more severe 
informational and commitment problems.  They are more prone to bargaining failures because 
the ideal point, or preferred policy they are willing to fight over, cannot be agreed upon within a 
fractured movement.  Informational problems are exacerbated because both sides’ natural 
incentive to misrepresent is magnified by factions that can act independently.  Even with an 
agreement, the lack of ideal point generates a commitment problem because the inconsistency of 
policy preferences today results in doubt over the willingness to uphold agreements in the future 
(Cunningham 2013). 
The duration of civil wars in the midst of fragmentation has further been a key dependent 
variable.  Formal theories tended to predict that a more complicated war is a longer war, as a 
stalemate is more likely among actors with multiple preferences.  Utilizing computational 
methods, Findley and Rudloff (2012) find this is not always the case.  Fragmentation often leads 
to shorter wars ending in a negotiated settlement.  When new actors join, it becomes clear they 
cannot beat all other actors.  It becomes optimal to negotiate instead of fighting a prolong war.  
Alternatively, new actors may not be as committed and thus open to settlements short of 
victory.  Further predicting shorter wars, Driscoll (2012) demonstrates warlords in competition 
can build coalitions in order to quickly gain the strength to take the capital and gain the spoils of 
war.  Civilian leadership installed will provide selective accommodation to militia leaders in this 
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initial coalition, thus cementing the power of both sides and locking out warlords that did not 
initially collude. 
 Examining more formal alliances among rebel groups, Akcinaroglu (2012) uses 
observational data to assess how rebel alliances affect war duration.  Joining an alliance 
increases the relative strength of each group while reducing the resources the government can 
allot to any one group.  This ultimately prolongs wars, as alliances won’t lose because they allow 
weaker actors to become stronger by sharing scarce resources, tactical support and intelligence.  
However, the probability of peace settlements is not increased since the government cannot 
cheaply buy off a group of many rebels. 
 Finally, competition within rebel groups leads to an increased probability in the 
recurrence of civil wars.  Alliances face an internal security dilemma in which each actor fears 
defection.  Thus, members increase their own relative capabilities in order to respond in kind to 
defections.  Furthermore, groups won’t freeride in an alliance as they all need to be prepared for 
possible fragmentation, when you may need to fight your enemy.  Correspondingly, this build up 
of capabilities in competitive alliances leads to civil war recurrence as members cannot trust 
power-sharing agreements (Zeigler 2013). 
Terrorism 
 Examining the number of ties terrorist groups have with other terrorist groups, Asal and 
Rethemeyer (2008) find that alliances ultimately bolster the capabilities of groups in an alliance, 
as they spread out the mobilization of tasks and diversify risks.  In light of these bolstered 




Instead of just absolute numbers, Horowitz and Potter (2014) argue it is instead the depth 
of ties in an alliance that drives lethality outcomes. All else equal, groups prefer to ally with 
stronger groups.  The aggregate abilities of groups in an alliance is often higher, allowing them 
to undertake larger scale attacks.  This is because they can access tactical and technological 
develops from their allies, in the form of weaponry and training.  Another partner in the core 
network, measured by eigenvector centrality, gives resources that an isolated partner cannot.  
Again, well-connected groups are found to be, on average, more lethal than poorly connected 
groups. 
Militia 
 Much like rebel groups allying in civil wars can increase the rebels’ chance of victory, 
militias allying with a government can increase the probability of a government victory. Pro-
government militias both give a wealth of tactical intelligence to the government by leveraging 
local knowledge, as well as isolating insurgents from non-combatant populations physically as 
well as politically, thus limiting insurgent resources (Peic 2014).  
The abundance of literature on militias in civil wars, however, has focused on their 
accountability to their state sponsor.  As discussed previously, theories of militias posit that 
states have a strategic interest to outsource violence to militias to avoid accountability in civil 
wars.  In turn, they also lack control over these militia and the upholding of human rights 
(Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014).  Accordingly, militias are theorized to utilize more 
indiscriminate violence, often targeting civilians.  Yet, recent literature has found that this 
indiscriminate violence is mediated by the recruitment networks.  Militias kill fewer civilians 




1.3.4 Parent Organization Level: Why parent organizations seek affiliates 
 Several existing theories account for why parent organizations seek out affiliates.  For 
example, the terrorism literature has utilized Prospect Theory in which a group’s strength 
determines its actions; the militia literature has utilized the role of the central government and 
accountability; yet, the rebel group’s literature has almost uniformly treated alliances and 
fragmentation within civil wars as horizontal.  However, each of these theories only accounts for 
the decision calculus of the parent organization or horizontal alignments.  The choice of a 
potential affiliate to join the brand of the parent organization remains under-explored, yet a key 
aspect of understanding the dynamics between parent organizations and their subordinates.   
Terrorism  
Terrorist groups have seen a recent wave of pledging, mostly among Islamic groups 
pledging allegiance to the parent organizations of al-Qaeda or ISIS. Situational factors, such as 
how much pressure the group is under, have been utilized to inform their decision-making in a 
need-vs-opportunity framework.  For example, using Prospect Theory, we can understand why 
al-Qaeda pursues specific affiliations.  The risk propensity of al-Qaeda depends on their domain.  
When they are in a domain of gains, they are risk-adverse.  If they are in a domain of losses, they 
are risk acceptant (Quattrone and Tversky 1988).   al-Qaeda was in a domain of losses when their 
survival was threatened post-9/11. They were driven to expansion by need rather than 
opportunity.  They did not utilize a forward-looking costs versus benefits evaluation of when and 
which pledges to pursue and accept.   
Rather, their position of weakness after the international community increased 
counterterrorism measures post-9/11 forced their hand.  The weaker al-Qaeda is, the more 
inclined they are to form affiliations.  Their attacks in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s failed to 
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mobilize the umma (Islamic community).  There was no mass commitment to the greater jihadi 
movement under al-Qaeda.  In response, al-Qaeda was forced to mobilize the umma in a 
piecemeal manner—by forming affiliations.  In co-opting other jihadi movements, al-Qaeda 
continues to survive despite great pressure and make progress towards their ultimate goal of an 
Islamic caliphate. Accordingly, they were willing to risk accepting affiliates, including some 
with different preferences that may threaten the brand name, in order to potentially expand and 
survive.  This need-driven action is inherently risky, but al-Qaeda was forced into the choice 
(Mendelsohn 2016).  Still, though al-Qaeda was in a situation of need, it remains unclear why so 
many groups would pledge allegiance to them, thus drawing the ire of the international 
communities’ counterterrorism measures upon themselves. 
Militia  
Militias are groups that utilize political violence but operate outside the command 
structure of the government-sponsored military or police forces.  They have been used as 
auxiliary troops in both inter and intrastate wars, while not being connected to the government in 
an official capacity. Because of their informal status and often poor training, governments often 
have a more difficult time controlling militia, often leading to a divergence of actions from the 
preferences of the government.  For example, militias are often associated with a higher number 
of civilian casualties (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014).  Yet, governments still utilize them with 
some regularity. Despite the costs of divergent preferences, militias still minimize the costs of 
counterinsurgency, give local knowledge, legitimacy and access to regions in which the 
government may not otherwise have reach, or serve as a force multiplier when the army is 
depleted or purged (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015; 
Kalyvas 2006; Eck 2015). 
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The biggest benefit of utilizing a militia is they allow governments to evade 
responsibility for violence against rebels.  Governments purposefully create informal ties with 
militias to avoid accountability for their violence.  By providing little information about their 
relationships with the militia and by imposing a low amount of sanctions on the groups (mostly 
for show), accountability cannot be established (Carey et al 2014).   
Regardless of why governments utilize militias, however, the link between these local 
militias and their choice to align with the government remains unclear.  For example, in Pakistan, 
the government has historically utilized militias to carry out their foreign policy strategy in 
Kashmir. In the first Kashmir war in the late 1940’s, they send thousands of Afridi tribesman 
into the region in an attempt to induce Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.  In the 1965 Kashmir 
War, the Pakistani government aligned with and trained the Razakar and Mujahid militias that 
existed in the Pakistani-aligned region of Kashmir, using the militias as the majority of their 
troops.  Yet, in both cases, Pakistan has denied formal ties with the militia, publicly supporting 
the Indian troop’s counterstrikes and UN intervention against the militias (Kapur & Gaguly 
2012).  Why would these militias align with the government, knowing they would not be 
supported in the crackdown against them? 
Rebel Groups  
Though not conceptualized as affiliation, the civil war literature has recently examined 
the role of disparate power in alliance formation within civil wars.  Rebel groups can make a 
tradeoff between decision-making autonomy and increasing capabilities through asymmetric 
alliances, in which one group is more powerful. Powerful groups can still maintain autonomy 
over security by forming alliances with weaker partners amenable to influence. Weaker groups 
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can receive greater security considerations in return. In the Syrian context, little evidence has 
been found to support this theory (Gade et al. 2019). 
1.4 CONTRIBUTION: GROUPS CHOOSING TO AFFILIATE WITH A PARENT ORGANIZATION 
 Previous literature has approached alignment from several different angles.  Drawing 
from literature on alliances in other bodies, such as between states or political parties, political 
violence groups have been found to form alliances for several reasons. These range from rebel 
groups overcoming collective action costs to terrorist groups’ material interests. The effects of 
alliances have also been widespread and inconclusive.  Specifically examining parent 
organizations in hierarchical alliances, the terrorism literature has drawn from general I/O 
psychology and economics theories to describe why a group may seek out subordinates, while 
the militia literature has focused on the role of government accountability in forming these 
hierarchical alliances.   
 The roles of each of these types of groups—militia, terrorist and rebel—have been 
studied in isolation of one another.  Yet, these groups overlap in many ways.  Rebel groups often 
use terrorism as a tactic in civil wars.  Terrorist groups will claim territory.  Militias influence the 
length, intensity and outcome of civils wars in the same ways rebel groups do (Findley & Young 
2012; Jentzsch et al 2015).  Integrating a theory of political violence, regardless of subtype, will 
do away with the biases of these false dichotomies. 
I instead generate a theory of alignment in which all types of political violence groups 
specifically search out a well-known parent organization with whom to align.  They do so in 
order to gain access to the broader base of supporters associated with this parent organization.  
These supporters can provide valuable resources such as finances or act as fighters.  The act of 
pledging serves as a costly signal to these potential supporters that the group is legitimate and 
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highly committed to the goals of the parent organization.  This signal is costly because they open 
themselves up to a potential crackdown after pledging, as they come under the same counter 
political violence pressure as the parent organization.  This theory is both specific to political 
violence groups, yet flexible enough to encompass many types of illicit groups across time with 
regards to any region, ideology, or time frame. 
Overall, my work contributes to the civil conflict literature by helping us understand the 
strategic choices of political violence groups. Previous literature often utilizes heuristics to 
predict or explain the choices of these groups.  For example, theories predict groups with the 
same ideology may all form an alliance or groups may seek minimum winning coalitions.  Yet, 
these approaches often treat groups as interchangeable – any shared ideology should generate an 
alliance or any group can be part of a coalition, as long as it meets the minimum winning criteria.   
The lack of consideration to the group identity limits understanding of both who groups ally 
with, but also which groups choose not to form alliances.  This decision to not form an alliance 
can be equally important. This work offers an explanation for why groups who do not want to or 
cannot pay the costs associated with joining an alliance with a parent organization, even though 
they share an ideology and have the potential for resource accumulation and would be assumed 
to join an alliance under previous theories, will instead choose to not enter one. 
My work examines the politics behind these decisions. Affiliate groups specifically 
choose a parent organization to leverage their public announcement and the ensuing potential 
crackdown as a costly signal to receive resources.  This strategic choice brings understanding to 
the reasoning behind who specifically groups choose to form alliances with, as well as the 
benefits this brings beyond just the high-level outcome of winning or losing.  
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This line of research further speaks to the broader state formation and building literature.  
Among states, there is a constant negotiation of institutional orders, including alliances, 
coalitions and hierarchies, particularly at key conflict points. States take these actions to try and 
increase capacity (ability to govern) and legitimacy (right to govern), ultimately challenging 
underlying state structure and redefining existing order (Wagner 2007, Lemke 2019).   
Through vertical alliances, I offer a novel perspective of political violence groups taking 
similar coordinating actions to try to increase their own legitimacy and capacity.  They can 
ultimately affect this same state formation process. Nested in layers below state-to-state 
interaction, political violence groups can form vertical alliances in order to increase their own 
capacity and legitimacy, allowing them to more effectively challenge and negotiate with states, 
with the potential to redefine the structure from below.   
1.5 OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION 
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I develop a formal model of signaling among 
potential affiliate groups.  Groups can utilize a pledge to a parent organization in order to draw 
resources from potential supporters.  These supporters follow the parent organization’s ideology 
or subscribe to their expanded goals.  This new audience can offer support to an aligned group 
who signals it also subscribes to this ideology.  Support comes in many forms, from fighters, to 
finances, to a refusal to participate in counter-political violence activities against these groups. 
Supporters prefer to back committed, capable groups.  Pledging serves as a costly signal of 
group’s abilities, as groups aligned with a parent organization open themselves up to the same 
backlash faced by these parent organizations.  This chapter thus lays out the logic of why groups 
would affiliate in the first place. 
23 
 
The third chapter provides an overview of the research design.  Chapters four through six 
provide empirical tests of the assumptions and implications of the theory.  Chapter 4 utilizes a 
comprehensive list of political violence groups in the South Asian countries of Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and India to predict when groups decide to pledge.  I find support for the argument that 
the potential costs of a crackdown post-pledging drive this decision. In chapter 5, I explore when 
affiliate groups are more likely to receive resources.  I expound upon the assumptions from the 
formal model that pledging generates a costly risk of backlash from the international community 
and that potential supporters observe this signal. Utilizing a randomized survey experiment 
administered to over 1,000 respondents in India and Pakistan, I verify these assumptions.   
Chapter 6, published in the Journal of Peace Research, examines further effects of 
pledging on the violence levels of groups under certain circumstances.  I find affiliates of al-
Qaeda and ISIS must escalate their violence in both number and severity of attacks, following an 
outbidding logic, in order to differentiate themselves and gain support from the parent 
organization’s broader Salafi Jihadist audience.  This occurs when the marketplace of affiliate 
groups is over-crowded, thus rendering the information provided by pledging weaker. Groups 






While the majority of the literature on affiliation has been situated solely in the terrorism 
literature and focused on the parent organization as the locus of the decision to align, the 
question remains: why would existing rebel, militia or terrorist groups affiliate with a parent 
organization, given the increased probability of a crackdown they face?  Ultimately, affiliation 
can serve as a signal of the group’s type (or commitment to the expanded goals of a parent 
organization) and result in the group gaining the support of a potential audience. 
The question remains: how do you make this signal credible?  Why should you be 
believed when your preferences cannot be directly observed and you have an incentive to bluff?   
The main way is making the signal costly.  It must entail the incurrence of costs that an 
uncommitted party would not be willing to suffer. These costs can be generated in four ways: (1) 
costs arising from the risk of accidental war (Shelling 1960); (2) sunk costs inherent in the act of 
making the threat mobilizations (Fearon 1997; Slantchev 2011); (3) audience costs (Fearon 1997; 
Sartori 2005); and (4) costs imposed by the adversary in reaction to a threat (Trager 2010).  
Pledging generates costs via the fourth mechanism. 
 By aligning with a parent organization, groups know they will have an increased risk of 
backlash, such as task force targeting, drone strikes, ground troop attacks or disrupted finances, 
from the national or international community committed to eradicating political violence.  The 
group will become higher profile, as they become part of the brand of an existing parent 
organization.  Only groups willing to incur this risk pledge, thus making pledging a costly signal 
of the group’s commitment to their goals and successes.  It is the very risk from the international 
community generated by pledging that makes pledging worth it.  This risk shows the 
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commitment of the group.  Ultimately, groups that successfully align with a parent organization 
draw in an expanded base of supporters that want to provide resources to a legitimate group who 
is interested in achieving a bigger goal.  In the above examples, these resources would be foreign 
fighters and finance networks for AQI, weapons and training opportunities for the Kashmiri 
militias, and an expanded market for Syrian affiliates. 
2.1 SIGNALING GAME 
  I utilize a formal model as a structure for the theory for several reasons.  First, it 
organizes the logic behind the theory presented above.  This particular model serves as an proof 
of a pledging equilibrium and defines under what conditions it exists.  Since pledging is a 
phenomenon that we should ostensibly not expect to observe, the formal model lays out the 
circumstances under which we would observe political violence groups to align with a parent 
organization and receive resources, further explored empirically in chapters 4 & 5.  Second, I can 
then utilize the model to further explore patterns of pledging, as proposed in Chapter 6.  The 
conditions of the model can help generate new empirical avenues to investigate (Clarke & Primo 
2007). 
2.1.1 The Model  
Suppose a group (G) is an existing political violence group, such as a terrorist group, 
militia, or rebel group.  G can potentially increase its support by pledging allegiance to a parent 
organization, because this larger, better known parent organization has a broader base of support. 
This base includes existing member of the parent organization and sympathizers who may be 
willing to offer resources, such as fighting or finances, to those aligned with the parent 
organization’s goals that they know and support.  By affiliating with this organization, G can get 
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access to this base of support and expand its pool of available resources needed to achieve its 
goals.   
Next, suppose this audience (A) can choose to offer its support and resources to G or not.  
A can observe whether G has pledged allegiance to the parent organization or not.  However, it is 
uncertain about the type of G—local or expanded.  A local group is interested in achieving a 
regional or ideologically contained goal.  For example, the IRA was interested in re-unifying a 
Catholic Ireland, but not spreading that ideology beyond those borders.  An expanded group is 
interested in a larger goal.   
A would prefer to support an expanded G.  The worst option is supporting a local G who 
pledges in order to get resources.  For example, the terrorist group Boko Haram pledged 
allegiance to al-Qaeda and later ISIS. Yet their goals turned out to be distinctly local—utilizing 
an extreme version of Sharia law in order to minimize the role of women and education in the 
Western mountains of Nigeria.  Their preferences diverged so deeply from ISIS, al-Baghdadi 
(the leader of ISIS) denounced the Boko Haram leader in 2016 (Onyanga-Omara 2015).  
 
The game tree in Figure 1 shows that Nature first chooses G’s type, expanded with 
probability Φ and local with probability 1- Φ.  This is only known by G.  When expanded, G has 
a higher valuation its main goal than when G is local.  It knows achievement of this expanded 
goal will have effects beyond just itself.  A local G is only interested in its own group-specific 
goal, thus resulting in a lower valuation.  To formalize this, the goal of either type is χ, where 
𝜒 > 0.  When 𝜒 = 𝜒, G is the expanded type.  When 𝜒 = 𝜒, G is the local type, where 0 < 𝜒 <
𝜒.  For example, a pledged terrorist group such as AQI was interested not only in winning the 
insurgency in Iraq in 2003, but also restoring the Islamic Caliphate, as al-Qaeda called for.  A 
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broader audience was then interested in supporting AQI than other local Iraqi insurgency groups.  
G’s ambitions can thus shape A’s incentives to support or not. A would prefer to stay neutral if G 
is local, but to support G if they are expanded because they have a better opportunity to achieve a 
bigger goal, 𝜒.   
Next, G chooses whether to pledge to a parent organization or not (pledge or ~pledge).  If 
G pledges, it pays a cost but its probability of achieving its goal is boosted.  Its probability 
remains at the baseline level if it does not pledge.  A then chooses whether to support the group 
or not (support or ~support).  If A supports, it pays a cost but also gains a boost in the probability 
of benefiting from the achievement of G’s goal. 
If A supports a pledged G, it is assumed there will be a national or international 
crackdown.  Political violence groups always face some type of pressure from the government, 
as their actions threaten the government’s monopoly on violence and thus must be attempted to 
be stopped (Bueno de Mesquita 2005).  This crackdown is in addition to this baseline level of 
pressure that exist for all groups, pledged or not.  For example, after a terrorist group pledges 
allegiance to al-Qaeda or ISIS, they are added to the UN 1267 Sanctions list, which mandates 
travel bans and financial freezes and authorizes the use of military force against these groups.  
Nature chooses with probability β if G will be significantly hindered in the probability of 
achieving their goals by this crackdown, paying α, and 1-β if G will not be hindered beyond 








The game can therefore end in four ways: G does not pledge and still receives support 
from A (~pledge, support); G does not pledge and does not receive support from A (~pledge, 
~support); G pledges and does not receive support from A (pledge, ~support); G pledges and 
receives support from A, with nature then choosing the probability of a successful crackdown 
(pledge, support). 
After A’s move, both players receive a payoff, 𝜒, reflecting their expected outcome of 
achieving the goal, less their respective costs, such that 𝜒>0.  G pays the cost, c, if it pledges.  
This represents costs such as losing some autonomy over group actions once aligned with a 
parent organization.  A pays a cost to support, k.  This reflects the actions of supporting, such as 
diverting fighters on finances to G.  An expanded group receives the payoff 𝜒 = 𝜒, while a local 
group receives the payoff  𝜒 = 𝜒, where 0 < 𝜒 < 𝜒.  For A, this payoff is modified by the bias 
term, π, where 0<π<1.  This represents the extent that A’s (and the parent organization’s) goals 
align with G’s.  Higher values of π are indicative of a tighter alignment.    
 The baseline probability of either player achieving this goal is ρ, such that 0<ρ<1.  This 
baseline probability can receive a boost when G pledges, v, and when A, supports, σ, such that 
0<v<1 and 0<σ<1.  Therefore the probability of achieving 𝜒 is: 
(𝜌 + 𝑣 + 𝜎) 
 For the generic type of each player, the payoffs are as follows: 
If (~pledge, ~support): EUG = χ(ρ);   EUA = πχ(ρ) 
If (~pledge, support): EUG = χ(ρ+σ);   EUA = πχ(ρ+σ) - k 
If (pledge, ~support): EUG = χ(ρ+v) - c;   EUA = πχ(ρ+v) 
If (pledge, support): EUG = χ(ρ+v+σ) -βα - c;   EUA = πχ(ρ+v+σ) -βα - k 
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Thus pledging and supporting can increase the probability of receiving the payoff 𝜒 with 
the boost of v+σ. But this must be weighed against the probability of paying the costs of a 
crackdown, βα.  This highlights the strategic problem. The value of χ can offset this decreased 
likelihood of achieving the goal, but A is uncertain as to the type, and thus value, of G. Below, I 
show a set of equilibria in which G utilizes pledging as a way to signal its type.  
2.1.2 Equilibria Analysis 
 Figure 2 plots the existence of four different equilibria as a function of G’s cost for 
pledging, c, and A’s cost for supporting a group, k.6  The four equilibria are: a separating 
equilibrium in which only expanded types of G pledge and A supports when a group pledges; a 
semi-separating equilibrium in which the local G uses a mixing strategy when deciding to pledge 
and A uses a mixing strategy to decide when to support after observing pledge; a pooling 
equilibrium in which all types of G pledge and A supports after observing pledge; and a pooling 
equilibrium in which no types of G pledge and A never supports after observing no pledge.
 




Figure 2:  Equilibrium Space 
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Across the horizontal axis, G must be willing to pay a higher baseline cost in order to 
pledge, such that the highest costs are farthest away from the origin.  Moving up the vertical axis, 
A needs to be willing to endure a higher cost in order to support any G.  This allows for a 
characterization of equilibria based on the anticipated costs both A and G will pay. c and k are 
intrinsically interlinked—G only wants to pay the cost of pledging if it anticipates support.  A 
only wants to pay to support an expanded G whose goals are in line with their own.  Pledging 
serves as a way for G to signal these expanded goals.  Ultimately, the threat of a crackdown, β, 
influences the costs both groups are willing to endure.  Below, I discuss the separating and semi-
separating equilibria, as those allow for pledging to serve as a distinctive signal. 
Proposition 1: semi-separating 
When 𝑥(𝑣 + 𝜎) ≥ 𝑐 + 𝛽𝛼 ≥ 𝑥(𝑣) and  𝜋𝑥(𝜎 ) ≥ 𝑘 + 𝛽𝛼 ≥ 𝜋𝑥(𝜎), the following strategies 
constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).  If expanded type, G pledges.  If local type, G 
pledges with probability r* and ~pledge with probability 1-r*.  If G ~pledges, A believes Φ’=0 
and ~ support.  If G pledges, A believes Φ’=μ and supports with probability f*, while ~support 
with probability 1-f*. 
 Proposition 1 outlines the strategies that constitute the semi-separating equilibrium in 
Figure 2.  The expanded type of G always pledges.  The local type, though, does so 
probabilistically, allowing for the possibility of bluffing.  A local G randomizes between 
pledging, imitating the expanded types, and revealing its type as local by not pledging.  This 
renders A indifferent over supporting when it observes a pledge.  If it does not observe a pledge, 
it knows the group is local so it does not support.  But a pledge means either G was expanded for 
certain or a local G bluffed in order to get support.  While A will adjust its prior belief that G is 
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expanded upwards, it cannot be positive.  Thus, it randomizes between support and no support to 
ensure that the local type of G will also randomize, rather than all types of G pledging.  
 Because A finds it more difficult to judge G’s type by its action, it cannot know how 
desirable lending its support to G will be.  This equilibrium exists in a middling range of c.  The 
costs of pledging are not too high that it eliminates any bluffing local G, but not too low that all 
G pledge.  While on average A’s support will go to an expanded type of G, A may also find itself 
supporting local types that it does not want to or not supporting the expanded types that it does 
want to. Thus A is willing to pay a middling cost of k—not too low that they support all G that 
pledge, but not too high that they pay too much to support a local G. Because A already has 
higher belief that G is the expanded type if it pledges, altering the expectation of a successful 
crackdown, β, can change the incentives of each type to pledge. 
Remark 1: The greater the risk of a successful crackdown, 𝛽,  a lower cost, c, is needed to render 




If the cost is too high, the local G simply won’t pledge.  Thus, increasing 𝛽 makes it less 
likely that local types will join.  Expanded type, contrarily, are still willing to pledge at higher 
values of c.  This means pledging can still be used as a signal of type.  The separating 
equilibrium, on the other hand, serves as a perfect signal to A of G’s type, as only expanded 
types of G will pledge.  
Proposition 2: separating 
When  𝑥(𝑣 + 𝜎) ≥ 𝑐 + 𝛽𝛼 ≥ 𝑥(𝑣 + 𝜎) and  𝜋𝑥(𝜎) ≤ 𝑘 + 𝛽𝛼 ≤  𝜋𝑥(𝜎), the following 
strategies constitute a PBE.  G pledges if it expanded type and ~pledge if it is the local type.  If G 
pledges, A believes it is the expanded type, Φ’=1, and supports.  If G ~pledge, A believes it is the 
local type, Φ’=0, and ~support.  
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 Proposition 2 characterizes a separating equilibrium, which exists at higher values of c 
than the semi-separating.  In this part of the parameter space, G can use pledging as a costly 
signal to A. Because G’s signal is costly, it can count on A’s support after it pledges.  This differs 
from pooling equilibrium in which no groups pledge, shown in proposition 4, in which the costs 
of pledging can deter both types of G from pledging.  Here, though, the expanded type of G is so 
invested in gaining the support of A, it is willing to pledge at much higher costs than the local 
type.  This higher cost is what separates the expanded and local types.  Once pledged, A knows G 
is the expanded type that it wants to support, so it is willing to pay a higher cost, k.  Thus, this 
equilibrium exists in the top right corner of the parameter space, where both c and k are the 
highest. 
 Here, pledging serves as the most credible signal.  Only types of G willing to endure the 
highest levels of costs, c, are willing to pledge.  Thus, A, is willing to support at higher levels of 
k.  This willingness to endure costs also shifts in the value of β, or the expectation of a successful 
crackdown after a pledged G gets support from A. 
Remark 2: The greater the risk of a successful crackdown, 𝛽,  a lower cost, c, is needed for any 




 Increasing the probability of a successful crackdown lowers the costs that an expanded G 
and A will endure.  If they expect that there is a reasonably large chance that a crackdown will 
hinder their chances of achieving their goal, 𝜒, then both are less willing to pledge or support. 
Thus, as crackdown potential rises, only groups and audiences that are willing or strong enough 
to endure and pay the costs will pledge or send support. While this equilibrium perfectly signals 
G’s type, the pooling equilibria in Propositions 3 and 4 exemplify when pledging cannot be used 
to signal on the equilibrium path.   
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Proposition 3: pooling – all pledge 
When  𝑐 + 𝛽𝛼 ≤ 𝑥(𝑣 + 𝜎) and  𝑘 + 𝛽𝛼 ≤  𝜋𝑥(𝜎), the following strategies constitute a PBE.  
Both types of G pledge.  If G pledges, A believes Φ’= Φ and supports.  If G ~pledge, A believes 
Φ’’=1 and ~support. 
Proposition 4: pooling – none pledge 
When  𝑐 + 𝛽𝛼 ≥ 𝑥(𝑣 + 𝜎) and  𝑘 + 𝛽𝛼 ≥  𝜋𝑥(𝜎), the following strategies constitute a PBE. 
Neither types of G pledge.  If G ~pledges, A believes Φ’= Φ and ~support.  If G pledges, A 
believes Φ’’=1 and supports. 
Propositions 3 and 4 represent strategies in which G pledges or ~pledge, regardless of type. 
These types of equilibria do not give a sufficient signal.  The cost of pledging delineates these 
equilibria—if it is low enough, all groups will pledge.  If it is high enough, none will.  Because A 
is acting deterministically, regardless of G’s type, they place less importance on their valuation 
of k—it simply cannot be too high.  In proposition 3, if G ~pledge (an action off the equilibrium 
path), A knows it to be local and ~support.  In proposition 4, if G pledges, A knows it to be 
expanded and supports.  In both cases, A may take an action it regrets – support a local G or 
~support an expanded G.  It is willing to do so because it believes the difference between these 
groups is small, so it is willing to take an undesirable action occasionally in order to save the off-
equilibrium path costs. 
Remark 3: As the alignment of goals, 𝜋,  G has with A and the parent organization 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠,  A is 




 As the degree of goal alignment, 𝜋, tightens or approaches 1, the probability of the 
audience (and thus the parent organization) achieving their goal increases. Thus, the audience is 
willing to pay a higher cost, k, towards achieving this goal.  This is represented by a willingness 
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to endure more to send more resources to groups who demonstrate they are committed to the 
goals of the parent organization.   
This can be for several reasons. For example, a tighter alignment of goals could indicate 
that the parent organization will endorse or validate the pledging group, encouraging the 
audience to support them as well.  This was the case with AQI, as discussed in the introduction. 
After AQI pledged and made clear their goals aligned with the core al-Qaeda platform, bin 
Laden stated, "We ask God to accept this unity and bless it and for all to know, the dear mujahed 
brother Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is the prince of al Qaeda in Iraq, so we ask all our organization 
brethren to listen to him and obey him in his good deeds” (CNN 2004).  This marked the 
moment when AQI got access to al-Qaeda’s worldwide network of resources.   
2.1.3 Discussion  
 It is puzzling why political violence groups pledge allegiance to a parent organization.  
There are uneven direct benefits from the parent organization—groups don’t always get 
financing or technology due to the clandestine nature of terrorism or governments often deny any 
relationship with a militia.  Yet the costs are severe.  After pledging, groups must align their 
actions and goals with the parent organization.  They become involved in the international 
community’s crackdown efforts against the larger brand.  For example, al-Qaeda and ISIS 
recruits get placed on the UN’s 1267 list, rendering travel bans, financial freezes and the 
authorization of military force against them.  Militias in Kashmir were targets of Indian and UN 
troops.  Moreover, why does this broader base audience lend their support to the group if they 
also are targets of this crackdown?  
Pledging can serve as a costly signal of the group’s type.  If both the groups and the 
audience know that a crackdown looms, only the more committed type should pledge.  This is 
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the type of group with expanded goals.  These goals range beyond their region or specific 
ideology.  It is these groups that stand to benefit the most from pledging and are thus most likely 
to bear the costs of a crackdown in order to increase their likelihood of obtaining their goal by 
gaining the support of the audience.  The group can gain support from an audience because, once 
pledged, they join the larger brand of a parent organization and can pull from this existing, 
broader audience that follows the goals of the parent organization. 
There two types of equilibrium in which pledging exists as this type of signal.  In a 
separating equilibrium, pledging serves as a perfect signal of type.  It exists at higher values of 
the cost of pledging and the cost of supporting, which is intuitively in line with the costly signal 
theory I outline.  Paying the higher cost shows an expanded group’s commitment, thus making 
an audience willing to pay a higher cost to support.  The looming crackdown can influence these 
tolerances, with an increase in the probability of a successful crackdown making it more difficult 
to find low enough costs that an expanded group or audience are willing to pay.  In the semi-
separating equilibrium, an expanded type always pledges but the local type does so 
probabilistically. The costs of pledging are not too high to deter local groups from bluffing.  
Because the audience knows this, they also support probabilistically.   
The Pooling equilibrium, on the other hand, represent scenarios in which pledging (or 
not) does not provide a signal.  If all or no groups pledge, the audience cannot use their actions to 
differentiate among the two types of groups.  Chapter 6 specifically examines the effects of 
pledging when it no longer serves as a signal, because “all” have pledged rendering the market 
overcrowded.  Groups must then utilize further actions, such as raising the profile of their 
attacks, in order to send a costly signal to the audience. 
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2.2 EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Signaling Equilibria 
The model has interesting implications which shed light on both when we should expect 
groups to pledge, as well as when we should expect affiliated groups to receive support.  As 
found in both Remark 1 and Remark 2, as the likelihood of a successful crackdown (β) after 
pledging increases, the costs, c, groups are willing to endure must be lower in order for them to 
pledge.  This is evident in Figure 2 above.  As costs along the X-axis rise, groups become 
increasingly less likely to affiliate.  When costs are at their lowest (near 0), a pooling equilibrium 
in which all groups will affiliate exists.  When costs are at their highest, a pooling equilibrium in 
which no groups will affiliate exists. Separating equilibria exist in the middling range. In general, 
we should expect costs to matter when groups affiliate or not.  Thus, we have the straightforward 
expectation that costs affect the decision to pledge, such that: 
Hypothesis 1: The more likely it is a successful crackdown against the political violence group 
occurs, the less likely the groups are to affiliate 
Intuitively, from the model, groups with expanded goals should be most likely to affiliate 
because this is the signal.  Groups with state-level goals are more likely than local groups to 
affiliate, while groups with regional or international goals are the most likely to affiliate.  Groups 
anticipate receiving support when they can signal their commitment to the parent organization’s 
expanded goals.  However, because of the incentive to bluff, it may not be tenable to use the 
stated goal type of each group as a reliable predictor of affiliation.  Groups have an incentive to 
lie and state they have expanded goals in order to get these resources from the audience of the 
parent organization, when they will really pursue their own local goals. 
Instead, the actual actions of the groups can be leveraged to assess this intuition.  In 
general, as costs increase, groups are less likely to pledge.  However, as these costs increase, 
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more information about the type of group pledging is gathered.  From Figure 2, at low group 
costs, all types will pledge, rendering no information about their type.  As group costs increase, 
we observe a semi-separating equilibrium that begins to separate out types.  Only some local 
groups will be able to bluff.  As group costs continue to increase, we observe a separating 
information that provides the most information about the type of group pledging.  Only the 
expanded types will pledge at the higher costs. Because, at higher costs, affiliation can be used as 
a signal (as opposed to low costs when all groups will pledge, even if bluffing about their type), 
we should expect expanded groups to be the most likely to endure these high costs and send the 
affiliation signal. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: Given a group has affiliated, they are more likely to be the expanded type (have a 
broad goal) than non-affiliate groups. This is particularly true as the potential for a successful 
crackdown increases 
Key Mechanisms 
A key mechanism that drives the model is that pledging is a costly signal. Then, the 
parent organization’s base audience will support affiliate groups who can send this costly signal, 
supplying them with new and valuable resources.  From the formal model, the associated 
crackdown against affiliate groups is a key parameter of the model that ultimately drives a large 
part of the results.  More directly, this maps onto the parameters β and α in the model, or the 
probability (β) that a group will pay the costs (α) of a successful international or governmental 
crackdown against them after their profile raises with the act of pledging. The willingness of 
affiliate groups to incur these costs associated with potential backlash is what makes their signal 
of pledging credible, as it reveals them as an expanded type of group that will help advance the 
goals of the parent organization. 
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But is there an actually threat of backlash once pledged? I utilize a randomized survey 
experiment of public opinion on foreign policy issues, detailed in Chapter 3, to assess the 
validity of this mechanism. In other words, when a group has pledged to a parent organization, 
respondents should want to spend more money or commit more troops or police to countering 
that group if the threat of backlash exists.  This is based on literature from South Asia that shows, 
on average across countries as a whole, there exists only moderate levels of overall support for 
militant groups (Blair et al. 2013; Fair et al. 2014; Blair et al. 2014; Bullock et al. 2011).  Thus, 
we should expect the average citizen to favor a baseline of counter-violence spending as part of 
the foreign policy.  If pledging influences the level of potential crackdown, we should expect 
affiliate groups to encounter even higher levels of preferred counter-political violence activity 
than non-affiliated groups.  I hypothesize that when subjects receive information that a group is 
affiliated with a parent organization, they will support higher levels of monetary and personnel-
commitment counter-violence initiatives, such that:  
HYPOTHESIS 3:  When groups are affiliated with a parent organization, there is more counter- 
 
violence support from the public than when groups are unaffiliated 
 
 
The second aspect of the formal model to explore further is the part of the costly signal 
mechanism that assumes the audience of the parent organization is supporting a group that 
pledged because they observe this costliness.  If observed, the group has successfully signaled 
their type.  Again, because the group was willing to risk a crackdown from the international 
community, the audience assumes they are (most likely) an expanded type of group.  Thus, the 
audience and group’s ideology should align, making the group a type which the audience wishes 
to support.   
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Further outlined in Chapter 3, I utilize an endorsement experiment to gauge under what 
conditions supporters may be willing to send these resources.  I oversampled conflict zones in 
these countries and gave a battery of questions to judge respondents baseline support for political 
violence before offering the treatment of affiliation or no affiliation to assess its effect on 
willingness to provide support.  While baseline levels of support for militancy is relatively low, 
there is evidence that it is significantly higher in conflict zones in South Asia (Fair et. al 2014). 
 As the alignment of goals increases, the costs the audience is willing to endure in order 
to offer support increases.  Thus, if the audience receives the costly signal, they should be most 
willing to support.  They believe the alignment to be close, or they believe the group to have 
expanded goals that match the parent organization: 
Hypothesis 4: If a group pledged and there is a potential for a successful crackdown, the more 
likely the parent organization’s audience is to support the affiliate group 
Non-signaling Equilibria 
 As evidenced by the pooling equilibrium, sometimes affiliation doesn’t provide 
significant information to the parent brand’s audience.  When a larger number of eligible groups 
align with a parent organization, the audience still cannot differentiate among them.  Affiliation 
was not a strong enough signal.  Thus, affiliate groups must utilize other mechanisms to 
differentiate themselves and ultimately gain support.  I test this implication of the model utilizing 
all pledged and potential affiliate groups of al-Qaeda.  The brand which generates a broad base 
of supporters is Salafi-Jihadist Islam, which most often associated with the core of al-Qaeda.  
Since 2001, al-Qaeda has formally accepted affiliates who follow their specific form of Salafi 
jihadism.     
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 Throughout the early 2000’s, the crackdown costs imposed on al-Qaeda pledges were 
very high.  The UN 1267 sanctions regime was adopted to punish all individuals and groups 
associated with bin Laden.  In particular, the goal was to pressure these affiliates to ultimately 
turn over bin Laden to US or UN authorities.  Between these mandatory financial and travel-
based sanctions, and the US-led coalitions wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, pledging was indeed 
very costly. AQI bears evidence to this fact.  Indeed, during the years immediately after 2001, 
fewer groups pledged to al-Qaeda, seen below in Figure 1. This falls in line with the theory that 





Figure 3:  al-Qaeda Pledged Groups by Year 
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Yet, after bin Laden was killed in 2011 and ISIS started accepting pledges in 2013, the 
costs imposed on al-Qaeda affiliates lowered substantially with ther UN’s attention split between 
multiple groups and the US-coalition pulling troops out of previous warzones (Hashim 2014).  
With the costs low, we observe the pledging patterns fall more in line with a pooling equilibrium. 
As evidenced in Figure 1, starting in 2011, there was a sharp increase in the number of al-Qaeda 
pledges. Not facing high costs, groups could pledge more readily. The marketplace of al-Qaeda 
pledges has become crowded. Indeed, in 2013, 19 groups were pledged a parent organization, 
compared to two the year after al-Qaeda began accepting affiliates.  
So while pledging forms this potential for new resources by providing the necessary 
baseline verification that these groups follow and are committed to the desirable brand of al-
Qaeda or ISIS, potential supporters must still decide which exact group to back.  Logically, 
outbidding provides a way for affiliates to show their worth compared to other groups they know 
have pledged.  They can do this by increasing their visibility to potential supporters through 
escalated attacks. 
Outbidding occurs when a multiplicity of terrorist groups is present within a single state 
and must simultaneously vie for the same sources of support.  In order to gain support from 
domestic civilians, they must utilize increasing levels of attacks in order to differentiate 
themselves from other groups and gain a market share of support (Bloom, 2005).  Empirical 
support for this theory, however, has always been mixed (Crenshaw, 1985; Chenoweth, 2010; 
Findley & Young, 2012a; Nemeth, 2013; Conrad & Greene, 2015).  Here, I examine the 
transnational nature of outbidding in the context of terrorism.  Ideologies, such as religion, have 
been found to generate competition among groups trying to win their civil wars. (Toft, 2007, 
2013; Breslawski & Ives, 2018).  I argue shared ideology can also generate competition 
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transnationally among terrorist groups.  Groups across the globe that share the same ideology can 
further compete for resources, such as foreign fighters or funding, from non-state actors across 
international borders.   
For example, ISIS affiliates in the Philippines have outbid other affiliates, propelling their 
recent violence into an increase in valuable foreign fighters.  ISIS affiliates temporarily overtook 
the city of Marawi in 2017, ‘showing off a capability that few other ISIS branches have 
achieved’ (Postings, 2018).  Since the battle for Marawi, the ISIS affiliate in the Philippines has 
received over 100 foreign fighters from 16 different countries, a rate much higher than other 
affiliates.  Officials posit the Philippines is now an attractive home for foreign fighters because 
of this increased violence, stating ‘the actual fighting is still ongoing presently in [the 
Philippines] gives them a sense of purpose’ (Yusa, 2018).  As expected, supporters of the ISIS-
specific brand send resources to the affiliate group that distinguished themselves as the most 
capable over other groups in this competitive arena.  
al-Qaeda groups who have exhibited the most capability in conflict theatres such as Syria, 
Iraq, and Yemen have gotten the most external resources.  Potential funders and fighters can 
observe the leading groups and wish to send resources to these most visible groups.  The leading 
groups even draw trained fighters from other groups who wish to join the best affiliates, as they 
both make the most impact in achieving the brand’s goals (Lin et al., 2013).  This has influenced 
the actions and violence of groups who perceive themselves as underfunded, as they seek to 
catch up.  There is a geostrategic market, in which affiliate groups must demonstrate capability 
in order to draw the top resources, which this brand gives them access to, into their own group 
and conflict theatre.  
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Therefore, we can leverage this particular sample of pledged groups to more directly 
measure competition, or the number of pledged groups.  As the costs of affiliation lower starting 
in 2011, the number of groups willing to pledge will rise as we approach a pooling equilibrium.  
In this state, pledging no longer serves as a costly signal.  Thus we should expect pledged groups 
to need to send an additional signal to potential supporters.  Following the traditional outbidding 
literature, we should expect: 
Hypothesis 5: When the costs of pledging lessen starting in 2011, pledged groups commit more 
attacks as competition rises  
Beyond a greater quantity of violence in general, outbidding groups may change the 
quality of their attacks.  Needing to differentiate when multiple groups compete for the same 
market share of support, groups can increase the shock value of their attacks.  More spectacular 
attacks garner more media coverage (Scott, 2001; Weimann & Winn, 1994).  Media coverage 
allows groups to speak to a wider audience and use their attacks to convey their message 
(Hoffman, 2006).  In a crowded marketplace, these spectacular attacks serve as an efficient way 
for groups to differentiate. 
There are several ways to measure spectacular attacks.  Suicide terrorism has often been 
used as one operationalization.  The shock value of a perpetrator’s willingness to die for the 
cause communicates group’s disposition to escalate violence in order to prove their credibility 
and capabilities (Bloom, 2005).  As groups continue to pledge, we should expect groups to use 
suicide terror as they outbid one another for support: 
Hypothesis 6: When the costs of pledging lessen starting in 2011, pledged groups commit more 
suicide attacks as competition rises 
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Yet, suicide attacks are relatively rare.  A group looking to ratchet up the intensity of 
attacks may do so in other ways, which would not be reflected in data on suicide attacks. In 
addition to the traditional measure of suicide attacks as a shock value, groups can vary the 
severity of their target selection.  A target against infrastructure will generate less shock value 
than an attack against civilians, for example.  Additionally, groups can vary the severity of their 
attack type.  Attacks that generate no physical danger, such as unarmed assaults, will generate 
less shock value than attacks that are violent, such as bombings or assassinations (Conrad & 
Greene, 2015).  As groups continue to pledge, we should expect their attacks to escalate in 
severity: 
Hypothesis 7: When the costs of pledging lessen starting in 2011, pledged groups commit more 





3. Research Design 
 
3.1 PREDICTING PLEDGING 
Data Set 
 According to the theory, groups should affiliate when that act can send a costly signal. In 
order to test these hypotheses, I first gathered a sample of 367 militia, terrorist, and rebel groups 
which operated in the South Asian countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India from 1970 
through 2015.  The unit of analysis is group-year.  First, the network of horizontal alliances 
among these groups was compiled using a broad array of sources (see: SATP, TOPS, UCDP, 
BAAD, TRAC).  From this network, the population of vertical alliances was generated.  Each 
group in the sample was individually researched utilizing group profiles and news reports to 
determine if their alliance with another group was merely horizontal or that of an affiliate and a 
parent organization.  Below is the distribution of groups by type (Terrorist, Rebel, Militia, or a 
Hybrid), broken down by country.  In general, one type of group or one country does not 




Figure 4:  Groups by Type and Country 
Dependent Variables 
Hypothesis 1 states: The more likely it is a successful crackdown against the political violence 
group occurs, the less likely the groups are to affiliate 
Affiliates are part of a vertical alliance in which a parent organization is present.  The 
coding is based on both the group’s actions and words.  While announcing a pledge to a parent 
organization in the media is oftentimes observable, groups can still be affiliates in the absence of 
this formality when resources, such as fighters, financing, and training, clearly flow only one 
way from the parent to the affiliate. 
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Affiliate: The dependent variable for Hypothesis 1, called Affiliate, is a dichotomous 
variable in which 0 indicates a group was not affiliated with a parent organization in that 
given year, and 1 indicates a group was affiliated.  Groups can affiliate then dis-affiliate 
while still remaining in the dataset. 
A parent organization must meet two main criteria: be a recognized entity capable of 
having both a brand (a set of expanded goals it follows) and of being sanctioned.  This means a 
parent organization differs from what is often delineated an “umbrella organization,” under 
which many groups operate.  These umbrella organizations often do not have a leader, do not 
have members of their own, and are not a physical entity which could be targeted in a 
crackdown. 
 While this criterion is easy to meet with a parent organization such as al-Qaeda, which 
has its own unique group with an ideology that defines its expanded goals and is sanctioned in 
their own right, some may question if parent organizations exist outside this narrow Salafi 
Jihadist ideology.  One of many examples exists with The United Liberation Front of Western 
South East Asia (UNLFW), operating in India.  With 11 affiliates, this group has the expanded 
goal to fight for the right of sovereignty for all Indian tribes. Groups affiliating with the UNLFW 
put aside their local separatist goals to fight for this general right to sovereignty amongst all of 
India. The UNLFW have subsequently been sanctioned under the Armed Powers Special Forces 
Act in India since 2015 (Kalita 2015).  
 Affiliate groups must make some public declaration of support for a parent organization.  
For example, the People’s War Group (PWG), located in India, made a formal declaration of 
affiliation with the Coordination Committees of Maoist Parties and Organizations 
(CCOMPOSA) in 2001, putting forth a news report.  The CCOMPOSA parent organization 
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aimed to install leftist governments across India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.  Upon 
affiliation, the PWG got access to new financial channels and new training, as the CCOMPOSA 
coordinated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka (SATP 2018).  
Below is the distribution of the total # of groups affiliated, again broken down by type and 
group. 
 
Figure 5:  Affiliated Groups by Type and Country 
 
Hypothesis 2 states: Given a group has affiliated, they are more likely to be the expanded type 
(have a broad goal) than non-affiliate groups. This is particularly true as the potential for a 
successful crackdown increases 
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Hypothesis 2 predicts affiliate groups will be more likely to be an expanded type, 
particularly at higher costs when the signal they send by affiliation is costly.  They should have 
larger goals that better align with the parent organization.   
Goal Type: A categorical variable in which a group’s stated or pursued goal in 
observation can be a local, state, regional or international goal.  This variable was coded 
while reading group profiles and news reports, based on their statements and actions. A 
local goal is group-centric.  A state or regional goal occurs when the group has aims 
outside their own locality.  An international goal is global in nature. 
Explanatory Variables 
According to Hypothesis 1, the expected potential of a crackdown dictates when groups 
will pledge to a parent organization.  The explanatory variables thus capture an expectation of 
crackdown costs to the group.  I utilize different domestic measures of potential successful 
crackdown aimed to explain different aspects of government’s ability to sanction groups: 
military capacity, denying external support, governance quality and Political Terror Score, which 
represents current repression by the government.  I further utilize measurements of international 
costs: troops and foreign aid. 
Domestic Costs: 
Military Expenditure: First, the quality of military should be correlated with the ability of 
a government to crackdown on terrorist or rebel groups.  This variable is a measure of a 
country’s military expenditure divided by their GDP in any given year.  Country’s with a 
higher military expenditure should be expected to fare better in counter-terrorism and 
counter-insurgency missions.  All military variables are generated from the Correlates of 
War dataset (Singer 1987). 
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Deny External Support: Second, states ability to deny external support to terrorist and 
rebel groups should further be expected to correlate with a successful crackdown.  From 
the supply side, terrorist and rebel groups are typically at a resource disadvantage 
compared to the state.  If they could get these resources from an external state, they 
shouldn’t be expected to be as likely to pledge to get additional resources.  More directly 
related to a crackdown, from the demand side, external states will often provide support 
to terrorists and rebel groups to destabilize these group’s home state at a cheaper cost to 
the external state.  If this external support is absent, home states should be more stable 
and better equipped to fight off these groups (Salehyan et all 2011).  This variable, Deny 
Support, is a dichotomous variable coded as 0 if a group received any external state 
support and a 1 if they received no external state support. (Byman 2012; Högbladh et al 
2011, UCDP 2015, EDTG 2019). 
Tax/GDP: Hendrix (2010) offers a different way to measure bureaucratic capacity, 
through a tax to GDP ratio.  This captures the ability of a state to extract revenue.  Higher 
ability to extract this revenue suggests better bureaucratic, and thus governance, quality.  
Tax/GDP is a measure of the percentage of tax per GDP in each country.  Both 
governance variables are generated from World Bank data (World Bank 2018). 
Political Terror Scale: The PTS measures levels of political violence and terror that a 
country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level “terror scale,” with 5 being 
widespread abuses by the state (Wood & Gibney 2010). States actively engaged in 




International costs:  
 Governments have a latent ability to impose costs on violent groups operating within 
their own country, as measured with the proxies presented above which represent the general 
ability to efficiently impose force.  They also have a willingness to do so, as they need to remain 
legitimate authorities.  International costs are less uniform.  They tend to be more context 
dependent and require a much higher level of coordination in which states choose to impose 
force.  Accordingly, measures of international costs tend to be much more noisy than domestic 
data.  Rather than universal international costs, I present measures that are specific both 
contextually and temporally.   
US Troops: Measures a count of US troops stationed. The more troops, the costlier the 
potential crackdown.  This measure is only applied to groups operating in Afghanistan 
from 2001 through 2015 and is drawn from the “Boots on the Ground” monthly reports to 
Congress (CRS 2017; Kane 2012). 
US Troops Present: Is a dummy variable, with 1 representing the presence of US troops 
in a conflict context, rather than as part of normal basing operations.  These two variables 
are specific to Afghanistan. 
US Aid and International Aid: Measures the amount of aid in US$ distributed yearly, 
both from the US specifically and a total of all International aid (AidData 2016). For 
example, the United States distributes this aid contingent on Pakistani guarantees to 
combat terrorism and insurgency in the country, as well as allows the United States to 
operate drones within Pakistan’s borders.  When Pakistan fails on its end, the amount of 
aid is adjusted, evidenced as recently as 2018 (Ward, 2018).  This measurement of 




War: Measurement of major episodes of political violence, defined by the systematic and 
sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-
related deaths over the course of the episode (The Center for Systemic Peace 2018). 
Population: measures the logged population of a state.  Large populations may present a 
more difficult environment for governments to monitor and enforce anti-terrorism 
policies.  
GDPpc:  Governance quality is often used as a proxy measurement for a state’s ability to 
carry out counter-terrorist or counter-insurgency missions.  Though often contended, 
GDP per capita serves as a proxy measurement of bureaucratic and administrative 
capacity within a state.  As Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue, “the fundamental fact about 
insurgency is that insurgents are weak relative to the governments they are fighting, at 
least at the start of operations. If government forces knew who the rebels were and how 
to find them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured. This is true even in states 
whose military and police capacities are low.” States with a higher GDP per capita are 
often better able to manage information needed to crackdown on these groups.   
Trade: measures the total trade to account for the economic determinants of terrorism.  
GDPpc, Population and Trade are measured according to World Bank Indicators (World 
Bank, 2014).7   
Polity: denotes the current regime type on a 21-point scale.  Polity values <-5 are 
autocratic, Polity values >5 are democratic and Polity values in the middle are anocratic.  
 
7 Afghanistan is missing GDP data from 1982 through 2000.  Imputed data was used in the main analysis, with these 
years being dropped from the sample in the Appendix.  Results remain consistent. 
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Type: measures the type of group—Rebel, Terrorist, Militia, or Hybrid—based on the 
presence of each group in the key data sets (UCDP, GTD, PGM). 
Age and Age2: represent the time the group has been operating since 1970, in years. 
Splinter: A dichotomous measure accounting for the origin of a group, coded in 
conjunction with the Affiliation variable. 
Alliances: taken from the Phillips (2019) and Horowitz and Potter (2014) dataset, this 
variable is a count of the number of alliances each given group has in a given year.   
Cold War and 9/11: Temporal dummies to capture the regional interest of the United 
States and other Great Powers in regional conflict 
Estimation Strategy 
Because the Affiliate variable is dichotomous, I utilize a logistic regression model when 
testing Hypothesis 1.  The coefficients represent the change in the log-odds of Affiliation 
occurring.  When testing Hypothesis 2, I utilize a multinomial logit.  This model compares the 
probabilities that different independent variables will result in each respective outcome. The 
choice to affiliate is analyzed at varying levels of potential crackdown to assess the probability of 
a group having an expanded or broad goal, compared to a local goal.   
Estimating fixed effects in nonlinear models can run into the incidental parameter 
problem (Greene 2002). To avoid bias, I utilize cubic polynomials to account for time 
dependence (Carter & Signorino 2010).  I further provide results with country fixed effects in the 
Appendix. Results remain widely similar. 
3.2 SUPPORT FOR AFFILIATE GROUPS: EXPERIMENT 
According to the theory, political violence groups can use affiliation with a parent 
organization as a signal that they are willing to incur risks in order to pursue their goals and get 
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support from a parent organization’s supporters.  I assume that this signal is costly because once 
affiliated, the profile of the political violence group raises.  This opens them up to the national or 
international crackdown already experienced by the parent organization.  Because potential 
supporters want to back a capable, driven group that will advance the agenda of the parent 
organization they follow, affiliation serves as a way for the affiliate group to signal their 
intentions and gain support and increase their resources from this new, broader pool of 
supporters.   
There are two parts of this theory that deserve further exploration.  First, the question of 
if affiliation is actually a costly signal, in line with Hypothesis 3 which states: When groups are 
affiliated with a parent organization, there is more counter- violence support from the public 
than when groups are unaffiliated.  From the previously developed formal model, the potential 
crackdown against affiliate groups post-pledging is a key parameter of the model.  The 
willingness of affiliate groups to incur these costs associated with a potential crackdown is what 
makes their signal of pledging credible. But is there actually a threat of a crackdown once 
pledged? If pledging influences a possible crackdown inflicted by the government post-
affiliation, we should expect affiliate groups to encounter higher levels of potential counter-
insurgency activity than non-affiliated groups. 
The second aspect of the formal model to explore further is the mechanisms behind the 
costly signal. The model assumes the audience of the parent organization is supporting a group 
that pledged because they in fact observe this costliness, rather than other mechanisms such as 
common ideology.  This is in line with Hypothesis 4 which states: If a group pledged and there 
is a potential for a successful crackdown, the more likely the parent organization’s audience is to 
support the affiliate group.  To probe these mechanisms, I utilize an endorsement experiment 
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which presents a policy proposal to respondents and has them rate their level of support.  The 
control group simply rates their support for the policy proposal.  The treatment group rates their 
support for the policy, but is also given information about a group’s endorsement of it and their 
reasons for supporting.  More enthusiasm for the policy with a treatment (endorsing) group than 
the control policy provides evidence that there is latent support for the endorsing group.   
Data Collection 
The basic set up for this first part of the experiment has 1,060 respondents evenly drawn 
from the South Asian countries of Pakistan and India.8  A power analysis utilizing data from the 
pilot study indicated 118 respondents per group was needed (power = 0.8, α = 0.05).  Because 4 
unique policy proposals were presented, each policy vignette needed 236 respondents at a 
minimum to ensure no single policy was driving results. Thus, 944 respondents was the 
minimum. 
These countries both have a unique combination of factors which makes them appropriate 
to study for this question.  First, both are democracies. India has a polity score of 9 on a scale of -
10 (autocracy) to 10 (democratic), while Pakistan has a score of 7 (Marshall 2018).  When 
testing Hypothesis 3, this experimental design relies on asking citizens about their policy 
preferences and inferring how those preferences will impact government counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism actions.  Previous literature has found that in democracies, public opinion 
affects leaders’ actions.  Citizens care about foreign policy and policies regarding the use of 
force.  Democratic leaders care about remaining popular and thus electable.  Consistent with 
these facts, many studies have found that public opinion in democracy does indeed affect 
 
8 The experiment was funded by the University of Texas’ Charlie Wilson Chair in Pakistan Studies. It was 
determined exempt by the University’s IRB in July 2018, Study Number: 2018-004-0074. A pilot utilizing 250 
Indian respondents via mTurk was undertaken in November, 2018. 
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government’s military and security policies (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Baum 2004; Baum and 
Potter 2008; Berinsky 2009; Canes-Wrone 2006; Holsti 2004; Reiter and Stam 2002).  
Second, both have several ongoing political violence conflicts in which both parent 
organizations and affiliate groups operate9.  This is relevant for testing Hypothesis 4, which 
seeks to determine under what circumstances potential supporters of these groups are willing to 
give support to affiliate groups.  The fact that conflict is prevalent, combined with geographically 
targeted vignettes in an endorsement experiment (discussed below), gives the best potential 
chance to contact these potential supporters, who are a generally difficult to access population. 
Respondents in India and Pakistan were accessed via Qualtrics Panel, who contracts with 
local survey firms in order to draw random online samples which meet specific quotas. In this 
experiment, the quotas were mainly geographic specifications in order to target the policy 
proposals and potential affiliate groups to relevant audiences.  Outlined in more detail below in 
the discussion of the specific vignettes, citizens located in Northern India (for example) were 
exposed to treatments that pertained to policies and political violence groups that are active in 
the Northern India region. 
Similar to amazon’s mTurk, the survey firms contracted by Qualtrics Panel opened this 
survey to respondents via a Dashboard in which they could choose to participate.  All surveys 
were administered to respondents 18 years and over in English, as English is an official language 
in both India and Pakistan.  From July 15-22, 2019, respondents were first asked to give their 
informed consent, then were asked relevant questions about their location and religion (in 
Northern India).  Their location can be verified via IP address.  Once a quota was filled, further 
respondents meeting that quota were terminated.  For example, if the Balochistan quota was 125 
respondents and 125 respondents from Balochistan had already finished the survey, any further 
 
9 See: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia 
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Balochistan-based respondents would not be able to fill out the survey.  In total, the survey was 
open for 6 days in India and 8 days in Pakistan for the quotas to be filled. 
Because the policies and affiliate groups presented in the vignettes deal with ongoing 
political violence incidents, the specific regions in which these conflicts are occurring were 
oversampled.  This helped ensure that that the topics were relevant to respondents and that, to the 
greatest degree possible, potential supporters of these parent organizations and affiliate groups 
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Table 2:  Geographic Quotas in Pakistan 
 




The general demographic breakdown of respondents, compared to the national sample using data 

























































Table 4:  Demographics in Pakistan 
 In general, males and college educated respondents were overrepresented in both 
countries.  Islamic respondents were over-represented in India, but this was a purposeful over-
sampling in the Kashmir and Jammu region.  The samples of age brackets and political leanings 
remain not significantly different than the national data. 
The expected bias of oversampling males may be to find more support for political 
violence, as males tend to join these groups more often.  However, support in this experimental 
63 
 
design is purposefully broad (as it is an endorsement design conveying policy support, without 
explicit mention of how a respondent would support the group), so this bias may be attenuated.  
The expected bias of oversampling education is less clear.  The literature does not have a clear 
consensus on the affect of education on terrorism or rebel recruitment.   
3.2.1 Experimental Design 
Vignette 1  
Hypothesis 3 states: When groups are affiliated with a parent organization, there is more 
counter-violence support from the public than when groups are unaffiliated. Because directly 
asking about the questions I am interested in with this experiment—is there (and under what 
conditions exists) more support for counter political violence investments when a group is 
aligned with a parent organization—may bias subjects’ answers because of reasons such as 
social desirability, I implement a survey experiment with informational manipulations instead.  I 
am looking for subtle changes in subjects’ attitudes towards investments when I link the 
information provided with a parent organization and its affiliates. 
In the basic set up for the first vignette, testing Hypothesis 3, the experiment has all 
respondents rate their support for counter political violence spending and personnel commitment. 
Whether the vignette they read includes information about if a group is affiliated with a parent 
organization is manipulated, with the control group receiving no information about affiliations 
and the treatment group receiving information about affiliation among groups.  In each vignette, 
the potential parent organization and their ideology or brand was generally well-known to all 
respondents and was a realistic group that would take on affiliates. 
Other manipulations include: ideology of group (religious or leftist) and proximity of 
group (local to the respondent or not). Each vignette will be followed with questions probing the 
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individual’s familiarity with each group and their baseline levels of counter political violence 
support.   
Vignette 1 Experimental Set-up11 
 
An example control vignette in India is:  
 
Every year, the Finance Minister proposes the Union Budget for Parliament to 
approve.  Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine India’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year India has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against groups working 
against India’s interests. 
 Respondents received further information on the type and location of the violence.  This 
information was targeted to respondents based on their geographic location.  Respondents in 
Northern India could be exposed to the following information: 
• The violent groups were operating in Jammu and Kashmir region 
• The violent groups had an Islamic jihad ideology 
• The violent groups origin was India OR Pakistan 
• The violent groups were operating with the Parent Organization Lashkar-e-Taiba 
An example vignette, with the treatment of affiliation, given to a respondent in Northern India is: 
 
Every year, the Finance Minister proposes the Union Budget for Parliament to 
approve.  Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine India’s interest of promoting 
 
11 See appendix for full factorial design  
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peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year India has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic jihadi 
Pakistani groups teamed with Lashkar-e-Taiba, working against India’s interests in the Jammu 
and Kashmir region. 
Within Southern India, respondents could receive information that: 
• The violent groups were operating in the Red Corridor 
• The violent groups had a Maoist ideology 
• The violent groups origin was India OR China 
• The violent groups were affiliated with the Maoist Parent Organization CPI-M  
Pakistani respondents were given the baseline vignette:  
 
Every year, the Finance Minister proposes a government budget for President to 
approve. Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine Pakistan’s interest of 
promoting peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year Pakistan has an 
opportunity to alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against 
groups working against Pakistan’s interests. 
The following geographically targeted informational manipulations were possible, based on if 
respondents were located in Northern or Southern provinces: 
• The violent groups were operating at the Durand Line (North) or in the Jammu and 
Kashmir region (South) 
• The violent groups had an Islamic jihad ideology 
• The violent groups origin was India (South) OR Pakistan (North) OR Afghanistan 
• The violent groups were affiliated with al-Qaeda  
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Vignette 1 Dependent Variable 
As the key dependent variables, I measured subject’s willingness to invest in counter political 
violence spending in two ways.  First, subjects were asked: 
“How much monetary resources do you believe India should invest in counter-violence 
spending?”   
Second, they were be asked: 
 “If the option was available, please indicate the level of personnel, such as police or 
military troops, you believe India should invest in counter-violence efforts?” 
In each case, their answers were recorded on the five-point scale (with an option to not answer): 
• 1. Decrease the level of monetary resources [personnel] to none 
• 2. Decrease the level of monetary resources [personnel] moderately 
• 3. Keep monetary resources [personnel] the same as current levels 
• 4. Increase the level of monetary resources [personnel] moderately 
• 5. Increase the level of monetary resources [personnel] to the maximum level available in 
the budget 
• Prefer to not answer 
Vignette 2 
Hypothesis 4 States: Given a group pledged, when there is a potential for a successful 
crackdown, the more likely the parent organization’s audience is to support the affiliate group. 
We often cannot directly observe individual’s preference for support because of issues such as 
social desirability bias, in which individuals do not want to readily admit that they support any 
militant group.  Additionally, non-response rates will often be higher than other questions in the 
same survey.  However, survey experiment designs such as list or endorsement experiments can 
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help alleviate some of these bias concerns.  By indirectly accessing individual’s preferences for 
militancy, these experiment types can increase truthfulness of responses and improve response 
rates. 
The second part of the experiment accesses the subset of the experiment population that 
indicated low support for counter political violence spending.  As stated above, on average, I 
expect citizens to not support militancy.  But accessing the sample that does support will allow 
me to further explore the mechanisms of their support.  Previous literature has found that within 
conflict-affected regions, militancy supports tends to be significant (Fair et al. 2014).  Vignette 2 
uses an endorsement experiment to verify whether this sample does in fact support militant 
groups and under what circumstances.12  
An endorsement experiment presents a policy proposal to respondents and has them rate 
their level of support.  The control group simply rates their support for the policy proposal.  The 
treatment group rates their support for the policy and is given information about a group’s 
endorsement of it.  More enthusiasm for the treatment group provides evidence that there is, in 
general, support for the endorsing group.  Successful endorsement experiments have four 
qualities (Bullock et al. 2011).  They propose initiatives in the same policy space, they propose 
well known initiatives to minimize ‘don’t know’ responses, they pick a realistic endorsement 
group, and they pick an initiative that has a wide range of views so as to avoid floor or ceiling 
effects. 
Ultimately the goal of the endorsement experiment is to first assess if support for pledged 
groups really does exist.  Secondarily, to probe the mechanisms behind this support.  Again, the 
formal model assumes the audience that potentially offer support will observe a pledge, know 
it’s a costly signal and that probabilistically a group which pledges is more likely to align with 
 
12 Rosenfeld et al. (2016) found endorsement experiments to yield less bias when compared to list experiments. 
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the parent organization’s goals, and offer their support because of these two factors.  This 
mechanism is different than another proposed method in the literature that could drive support, 
blind support based on ideology, religion or ethnicity (Lyall et al. 2013).  
Vignette 2 Experimental Set-Up 
An example baseline control vignette, given to respondents in Northern India, is: 
A recent proposal calls for the Indian government to cease its “policy of restraint” along the 
Line of Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region. As Pakistani security forces and militant groups 
have increased their presence along the LoC, the Indian government has alleged an uptick in 
terrorist attacks. New calls have been made for India to engage militarily along the border in 
response to Pakistani violence. 
Respondents in India could receive the following informational manipulations: 
• The policy was the “Integrated Action Plan” to leftist Indian parties into India’s 
democratic society (South) OR calls for the Pakistani government to cease its “policy of 
restraint” along the Line of Control in the Kashmir region (North) 
• The proposal was backed by groups working with the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation 
Front (North) OR groups working with the Communist Party of India – Maoist (South) 
• These groups have religious (North) OR ideological (South) ties to the region 
• The groups could face negative and violent reactions from the government because of 
their affiliation, but continue to offer support for the proposal. 
Pakistani respondents were given the following information: 
• The policy was using peace jirgas to resolve disputes along the Durand line (North) OR 
calls for the Pakistani government to cease its “policy of restraint” along the Line of 
Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region (South) 
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• The proposal was backed by groups working with al-Qaeda (North) or==OR Kashmiri 
Tanzeems (South) 
• These groups have religious ties to the region 
• The groups could face negative and violent reactions from the government because of 
their affiliation, but continue to offer support for the proposal. 
An example of a treatment vignette, given to respondents in North Pakistan, is: 
A recent proposal backed by the Pakistani-based groups working with al-Qaeda has explored 
using peace jirgas to resolve disputes along the Durand line.   As security forces have increased 
their presence along the Durand line, the Pakistani government has alleged an increase in 
terrorism attacks.  New calls have been made for the Pakistanis to engage in peace jirgas. The 
groups working with al-Qaeda could face negative and violent reactions from the 
government because of their affiliation, but continue to offer support for the proposal. 
Vignette 2 Dependent Variable 
Respondents were asked to answer “How do you feel about this proposal?” on a 5-point scale: 
• 1. Strongly disagree 
• 2. Somewhat disagree 
• 3. Neither agree nor disagree 
• 4. Strongly agree 
• 5. Somewhat agree 
• Prefer not to answer 
If the mechanism of a costly signal, as I propose, is truly driving the results, I would 
expect the mean level of support for this policy to be most supported in cases where 1) a 
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geographically appropriate Parent Organization is the endorsing group and 2) individuals are 
informed that group may face backlash.  Importantly, the Qualtrics Panel allowed me to target 
specific policies to areas where potential supporters of the group exist. We know the average 
citizen does not support militants, but by leveraging location where supporters are more likely to 
exist, I can tease the mechanisms out among those who are more likely to offer support to an 
affiliate group based on their close proximity to the militants (Fair et. al 2014).  
In sum, this experiment will vary information given to subjects in a vignette about India 
or Pakistan’s counter-political violence spending.  By manipulating whether the groups are 
affiliates of a well-known parent organization, I can assess the assumption that pledging is costly 
because affiliate groups will face backlash.  Utilizing an endorsement experimental design, I can 
separate the mechanisms driving an audience of a parent organization to offer their support to an 
affiliate group.   
Further Questions 
 After each Dependent Variable question, respondents were asked how familiar they were 
with both the issue and the group (when applicable). Each question response was a 5-point scale 
with an option to not answer:  
• 1. Strongly disagree 
• 2. Somewhat disagree 
• 3. Neither agree nor disagree 
• 4. Strongly agree 
• 5. Somewhat agree 
• Prefer not to answer 
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They were further asked how important they thought the issue was to their country’s foreign 
policy, also answering on a 5-point scale:  
1. Not at all important 
• 2. Slightly Important 
• 3. Important 
• 4. Fairly Important 
• 5. Very Important 
• Prefer to not answer
Respondents were further asked a battery of demographic and opinion questions:13 
• What is your age in years? 
• What is your sex? 
• What is the highest class you completed? 
• Are you married? 
• Were you born in India [Pakistan]? 
• Do you currently live in India [Pakistan]? 
• In what State [province] do you live? 
• What country do you currently live in? 
• What language did you grow up speaking? 
• Do you have a religious preference? 
• How would you describe your financial situation compared to last year at this time? 
• Where do you fall on the political spectrum? 
• How important is a democratically elected government to you? 
 
13 See appendix for answer scaling 
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• How do you feel about the United States’ involvement in your government's politics? 
Estimation Strategy 
A difference-in-means test is used to test the null hypotheses, that there is no difference 
between groups with no affiliation and groups with an affiliation to a parent organization. A 
significant difference in the means of the responses between control and treatment groups would 
indicate support for Hypothesis 3, as measured by increased support for counter political 
violence spending if a group affiliates, thus making pledging a costly signal14.    
For Hypothesis 4, a significant difference in the means of the responses between policies 
with no endorsement and policies endorsed by affiliate groups (particularly those facing 
backlash) indicates potential supporters recognize this costly signal. 
3.3 FURTHER EFFECTS ON VIOLENCE 
Data structure  
The final empirical chapter examines the effects of affiliation on groups post-affiliation, 
particularly when affiliation occurs at low costs and does not act as a costly signal.  In this case, 
groups need to further differentiate themselves to garner support.  Looking at Salafi-jihadist 
groups, I examine the effects of affiliation as the number of affiliate groups increases.  The unit 
of analysis is group-month, with 55 groups included in the dataset.  This represents all Salafi-
jihadist Islamic terrorist groups found in the Global Terrorism Database and subsequently all 
potential pledges to a parent organization.  Figure 1 shows the variation in the number of Salafi 
groups operating and pledged per year from 2001 to 2014.  Overall, 43 groups eventually 
pledged to al-Qaeda or ISIS, with a maximum of 19 groups pledged at the same time and a 
 
14 As discussed, conflict areas were oversampled.  This may present bias when analyzing the public’s opinion on 
foreign policy.  However, I expect the bias to attenuate my expected results. 
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minimum of two.15  In general, the number of both Salafi groups and pledged groups goes up as 
time progresses.  However, there exist dips in certain years when Salafi groups ended or when 
previously pledged groups ceased to exist and other groups did not immediately fill the void.  
This variation can be leveraged to analyze whether the number of groups does in fact drive 
individual groups to increase the quantity and severity of their respective attacks per month. 
  
 
15 In order to focus on a brand with groups in direct competition, I only test with (potential) al-Qaeda pledges. 
Because ISIS started accepting pledges much later, only four groups in the sample pledged allegiance to ISIS. These 





Figure 6:  # Pledged groups by Year 
 
Dependent variables 
I utilize four total dependent variables to assess each individual hypothesis.  Hypothesis 5 
predicts more terrorism attacks as competition among pledged groups goes up, during the post-
2010 time period when costs of pledging are lowest.  Hypothesis 6 predicts an increase in suicide 
terrorism, specifically. 
Attacks: This variable is a count of all terrorist attacks undertaken by each respective 
group since 2001, when pledging started, according to the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) (START, 2015).   
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Suicide: This is a count of all suicide terrorist attacks undertaken by each respective 
group, according to GTD.   
Hypothesis 7 predicts groups will commit more severe attacks as competition among pledged 
groups increases. I measure severity in two ways: target selection and type of attack. 
Target:  To assess the severity of target selection and attack types, I follow the coding 
scheme of Conrad and Greene (2015).  GTD identifies 22 target selections.  They are 
grouped into 3 ordinal categories, based on the ‘shock value’ of the attack.  This measure 
is ordinal because as the categories increase, the attack target or type increases in shock 
value.  Indeed, a low-value attack on infrastructure is less poignant and less shocking 
than a high-value attack on citizens, which directly confronts a government’s ability to 
protect its people.  Target is coded as ‘1’ if the attack is against infrastructure, ‘2’ if it is 
against police, military, government personnel, other terrorists, or violent political parties 
and ‘3’ if it is against civilians.   
Type: GTD categorizes nine types of attacks according to the tactic used.  These tactics 
are also grouped into 3 ordinal categories.  Type is coded as ‘1’ in attacks in which 
humans are in no physical danger, ‘2’ when the attack poses an explicit threat to human 
life (such as hostages or hijackings) and ‘3’ when the attack is overtly violent (such as 
assassinations or bombings).  These categories are mutually exclusive. For both Target 
and Type, attacks listed as ‘Other’ are coded as missing, following Conrad & Greene 
(2015).  When a group undertakes no attacks in a given year, it is coded as ‘0’ to 
represent a decision to scale down violence or an inability to compete.  For each 





Regarding the interaction of pledging and the competitive environment, I test the 
interactive effect between Pledge * # Pledged Groups.   
Pledge: as a dichotomous variable which indicates whether a group is formally pledged 
to a parent organization (‘1’) or not (‘0’) in a given month.  Groups coded as 0 represent 
the time period in which a group enters the dataset before they formally pledge 
(switching to a ‘1’) or some groups that are Salafi jihadist groups, but never pledge.   
# Pledged Groups: is a count of the total number of pledged groups at any given time. 
This interactive analysis allows for assessment of the specific competitive environment among 
pledged groups. These counts are drawn from a combination of 2 sources: the United Nation’s 
1267 Sanctions list (2015) for all pledged groups and Jones’ (2014) work on Salafi groups.  
Groups which are charities or other non-terrorist group entities are dropped from the sample.  
Jones (2014) discusses the existence of all Salafi groups and the years in which groups have 
pledged allegiance.  The UN updates the list every time a group is added or deleted and issues a 
press release.  As of the end of 2014, the list has been altered over 50 times.  Additionally, 
groups fail to survive throughout the course of the sample time period, ensuring additional 
variation. 
Controls 
I control for variables that are likely to influence both competition among groups and the 
severity of that competition.  I first control for several state-level factors. In general, a state’s 
capacity should influence group’s ability to operate and thus be competitive and undertake 
terrorism attacks.  
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Civil War: is a dichotomous variable (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015). Governments 
engaged in civil wars may be less able to combat terrorism, allowing for groups to devote 
more resources towards terrorist violence.  Furthermore, there is often an overlap 
between civil war violence and terrorism which should be accounted for (Findley & 
Young, 2012b).   
Population: measures the population of a state.  Large populations may present a more 
difficult environment for governments to monitor and enforce anti-terrorism policies.  
GDP: measures the GDP to account for the economic determinants of terrorism.  Both 
Population and GDP are measured according to World Bank Indicators (World Bank, 
2014).   
Regime: denotes the current regime type on a 3-point scale.  Polity values <-5 are 
autocratic, Polity values >5 are democratic and Polity values in the middle (baseline) are 
anocratic. It is theorized that the impact of regime type on terrorism is an inverted U-
shape, with anocracies experiencing the highest levels (Gaibulloev, Piazza & Sandler, 
2017).  
Regime Change: is a dichotomous variable, in which ‘1’ denotes states that have 
undergone a change in regime type (3 point change on the Polity IV scale) and accounts 
for the possibility that terrorism may be a response to new or weak regimes (Marshall, 
2018).   
I also control for several group-level factors, which again influence whether groups can 
efficiently operate.   
Size: is a scale variable ranging from 1 to 4.  The four bins represent 99 or fewer 
members, 100 to 999 members, 1,000 to 9,999 members and 10,000 + members. Larger 
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groups have been found to survive longer, affecting their ability to undertake attacks 
(Jones & Libicki, 2008).   
Public Goods and Reputation: are a dichotomous variables derived from the Reputation 
of Terror Groups Database, which codes actions groups can take in order to build a 
reputation and represent how tied a group is to its local audiences.  Groups more 
interested in providing public or political services may be less interested in competition 
or undertaking terrorism attacks, as they build their reputations through other means 
(Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016).   
Age and Age2: represent the age in years.  Older groups may be better equipped to carry 
out attacks and more able to pledge allegiance.   
Overall Attacks: is a count of the total attacks in a given month by all groups in order to 
account for the general trends among Salafi groups.   
Competition: is a count of the total number of groups operating in a country at any given 
time.  This accounts for the traditional outbidding theory of more groups in a state 
leading to more competition, and thus more attacks (Bloom, 2005). These four variables 
are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (START, 2015).   
Alliances: taken from the Horowitz and Potter (2014) dataset, is a count of the number of 
alliances each given group has in a given year.  The total number of horizontal alliances a 
group has (rather than strictly if they pledged to a parent organization) may influence 
both the resources they possess and tactical diffusion among groups.  
Estimation strategy 
Because both dependent variables Attacks and Suicide are count variables, I use an event 
account model.  Poisson models assume observations are independent, which is not tenable here.  
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Since the event count variables of attacks and suicide attacks are dependent and also over 
dispersed, with a great variance in the number of attacks by a group, I utilize a negative binomial 
model.  Group and time fixed effects are included to account for the time invariant factors in the 
states each group mainly operates out of and for the general upward trend of groups pledging.  
Fixed effects generates a ‘within’ estimator, such that results can be interpreted as a unit increase 
in the explanatory variable yielding a change in the dependent variable, within each given group.   
As both dependent variables Target and Type are ordinal scales, I utilize an ordered 
logistic model.  I also include robust standard errors clustered by group to address any potential 
problems with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Greene, 2002) and continue to utilize 
time fixed effects. Coefficients for the respective key explanatory variables can be interpreted as 
an increase in the number or change in number of Salafi or pledged groups results in, on average, 
an x change in the quantity or severity of attacks for a respective group, compared to months 





4. Empirical Chapter I: Predicting Pledging 
4.1 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
Hypothesis 1 makes the fairly straightforward prediction that as the cost of affiliation 
rises, groups are less likely to affiliate.  Support for Hypothesis 1 would indicate that the costs of 
a potential crackdown dictate the decision to affiliate, in general. Overall, the average group 
cannot (or is not willing to) risk the costs of a crackdown post-affiliation.  Thus, we should 
expect the coefficients on the explanatory variables of interest to be negative and statistically 
significant.   
As evidenced in Table 5 below representing the costs of a potential crackdown using 
domestic costs, measured as Support Denied, Military Expenditure, and Tax Revenue (Tax/GDP) 
are indeed negative and significant.  These results indicate as the potential costs of affiliation 
rise, affiliation becomes less likely. The political terror score does not have a statistically 
significant impact, perhaps because of the limited variation within Pakistan, India, and 
Afghanistan.  All 3 countries score above a 3 (out of 5) for the vast majority of the years in the 
sample. 
Table 6 represents the potential for a crackdown based on international costs.  Both the # 
of US Troops in Afghanistan and the presence of US Troops in a warzone are negative and 
statistically significant.  The amount of US Aid and Total International Aid is also negative and 
statistically significant.  In general, the more international influence to induce a crackdown, 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Military Capacity Governance 
Capacity 
Deny Support Political Terror 
     
Military Expend -0.07** -- -- -- 
 (0.03)    
Tax/GDP -- -0.10*** -- -- 
  (0.03)   
Support Denied -- -- -0.38*** -- 
   (0.09)  
PT Score -- -- -- 0.05 
    (0.08) 
Splinter -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Age 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age2 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Terrorist 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.16* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Alliances 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
War 0.12 0.18* 0.14 0.16 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Polity -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDPpc 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Cold War -0.36** -0.36** -0.33** -0.34** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
9/11 -0.14 -0.02 0.12 0.10 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
Trade 0.01* 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -5.35*** -4.55*** -4.93*** -5.91*** 
 (1.28) (1.35) (1.30) (1.48) 
     
Observations 2,773 2,773 2,773 2,724 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Time Polynomials excluded from Table 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES US Troops US Troops 
Present 
US Aid All Aid 
     
# US Troops -0.07* -- -- -- 
 (0.03)    
US Troops Present -- -0.82*** -- -- 
  (0.28)   
US Aid -- -- -0.03** -- 
   (0.02)  
International Aid -- -- -- -0.01* 
    (0.01) 
Splinter 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Age 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Terrorist 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Alliances 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
War 0.15 0.22* 0.13 0.14 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
Polity -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDPpc -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population 0.17** 0.23*** 0.17** 0.17** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Cold War -0.36** -0.35** -0.42*** -0.43*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
9/11 0.26* 0.27* 0.25* 0.24 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -4.30*** -4.99*** -4.33*** -4.33*** 
 (1.35) (1.32) (1.36) (1.38) 
     
Observations 1,027 1,027 2,410 2,410 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Time Polynomials excluded from Table 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6:  Predicting Affiliation with International Costs 
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Examining the marginal predictions of each key explanatory variable in Figures 7 & 8, 
there is further evidence for Hypothesis 116.  A denial of external support, strong militaries, and 
competent governance structures all predict less affiliation among political violence groups.  In 
each case, when costs are low (on the x-axis), all groups are more likely to affiliate with a parent 
organization (higher values on the y-axis).  As costs rise, groups become significantly less likely 
to affiliate.   
For example when examining military capacity in Figure 7, when military expenditure is 
low (between 1 and 3 on the x-axis), the probability of a group affiliating is around 55-60%.  
When expenditure is high (between 9 and 12 on the x-axis), the probability of a group affiliating 
drops to approximately 40%. This logic exists for the presence of troops and foreign aid in 
countries as well.   For example in Figure 8, when US troops are present in a warzone and able to 
influence a crackdown post-affiliation, the probability a group affiliates drops by approximately 
20% 
In sum, the potential of a country domestically or the international community to impose 
a crackdown affects the decision of political violence groups to affiliate.  On average, the more 
costly affiliation would be, the less likely groups are to pursue these types of vertical alliances.  
The general group is unwilling to risk this costly crackdown to affiliate, and instead will choose 
to not form relationships or only form horizontal alliances. 
 
16 Ranges represent the min and max for each variable 
84 
 
Figure 7:  Predicting Affiliation as Domestics Costs Increase 
Figure 8:  Predicting Affiliation as International Costs Increase 
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However, we still do observe affiliation.  Under what circumstances do groups actually 
choose to affiliate?  From the model and the corresponding equilibrium space in Chapter 2, we 
observe that as costs rise, affiliation can be utilized as a costly signal. A pooling equilibrium, in 
which all types affiliate and there is no signaling, exists when costs are lowest.  But with higher 
costs, we should observe groups using affiliation as a signal, exemplified with the (semi) 
separating equilibria.  These equilibria separate out types – those who use affiliation to send a 
costly signal of commitment to the parent organization’s expanded or broader goals and those 
who are not committed and have local goals do not send this signal.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that an affiliated group will be more likely to be an expanded type, 
particularly at higher costs.  As the signal becomes costlier to send, local bluffers should no 
longer be able to pay the costs to affiliate.  At higher costs, only the committed or expanded 
types should be willing to send this affiliation signal and incur these potential costs.  This is 
because they anticipate resources from the parent organization’s expanded base of supporters 
after affiliation.   
Taking the interaction of affiliation with costs into account, Figure 9 exemplifies the 
logic of Hypothesis 217.  Domestically, affiliate groups are the most likely to affiliate at the 
highest costs, measured by military expenditure, governance capacity and the ability to deny 
external support. When examining the effect of the political terror score, affiliate groups are 
more likely to be the expanded type than non-affiliate groups.  However, this is true across 
almost all levels of the political terror score from 1-5 (thus the separating effect based on cost 
levels is not clear). 
 




Substantively, using military capacity as an example, at very low military costs (between 
1 and 3 on the x-axis) when all groups can risk affiliation while paying little costs, the groups are 
statistically indistinguishable from one another.  Pledging cannot reliably predict the goal type. 
Expanded types will affiliate, but so can local types because the costs are low. This is 
representative of the pooling equilibrium in which all groups will pledge. 
As the costs rise, when affiliation can be used as a signal and thus only truly expanded 
groups should be willing to affiliate and incur costs, we observe affiliate groups to be 
significantly more likely to be an expanded type than non-affiliate groups.  An affiliate group has 
a 35% probability of being an expanded type at these higher costs (when military expenditure is 
between 9 and 12), while a non-affiliate group has little more than a 15% probability of being 
expanded.   










In Figure 10, the probability of a broader goal based on the international costs of 
affiliation is further examined.  The # of US troops and their presence in a warzone both 
influence the types of group that affiliate.  Again, when costs along the x-axis are low, affiliate 
and non-affiliate groups are not statistically distinguishable. However, as the potential to 
influence a crackdown increases along the x-axis, affiliate groups are the statistically more likely 
to be the expanded type.  They state they have broader goals, matching a parent organization’s 
expanded goals. Affiliates are more willing to incur costs as a costly signal, as they can credibly 
signal their type as expanded.  The illustrative case below and Chapter 5 examine when this 
signal leads to more resources.  The level of aid, both in total and by the US specifically, does 










In sum, some groups will try to bluff and pretend to be committed to the parent 
organization through stating their goals as expanded.  Affiliating when the potential for a costly 
crackdown is high can help mitigate this, however.  Affiliation as a costly signal can demonstrate 
expanded goals that match the parent organization, allowing potential supporters to send 
resources to affiliate groups they know to be committed to the parent organization. 
There is a rich body of literature on alliances between all types of actors, whether states, 
international organizations or political violence groups.  Particularly among political violence 
groups, much of the literature examines the horizontal aspect of these alliances, however.  I 
argue we need a way to understand the more hierarchical nature these relationships often take on.  
Political violence groups, whether terrorist, rebel or militia, often purposefully choose to affiliate 
with a parent organization.  Political violence groups can use affiliation with a parent 
organization as a costly signal of their commitment to the goals of that organization. Indeed, 
statistical analyses find affiliate groups more likely to have these expanded goals, particularly 
when costs are higher and separate out the committed groups from bluffers.  
4.2 ILLUSTRATIVE CASE 
While the statistical analysis tests the broader relationship between affiliation and a 
potential crackdown, it does not examine the mechanisms of the theoretical argument. To 
address these, I provide a brief illustration of the logic of affiliation as a costly signal to obtain 
resources.  From the cases in the data, I utilize the group the United Liberation Front of Asom 
(ULFA), a hybrid rebel-terrorist group established in north east India in 1979.  Fighting for the 
right for an independent state, the group still operates today.  ULFA has been an affiliate to the 
parent organization the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFW) 
since 2015.  ULFA also had the opportunity to affiliate with the Indi-Burma Revolutionary Front 
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(IBRF) in 1990, but this group ultimately fell apart.  The ULFA case presents a unique 
opportunity to examine multiple decisions to affiliate by the same group, with different 
outcomes.  There is notable variation within the key independent variable (potential crackdown). 
ULFA formed in 1979 with a political and military wing.  It seeks to establish an 
independent state of Asom.  Asom is a peripheral region of India, sitting in the Northeast above 
Bangladesh.  Along with other states in the region, the Asomese people believe India has utilized 
state terrorism and economic exploitation against them.  Based on their ethnic identity and the 
perceived government abuse against the indigenous citizens, the Asomese people believe they 
have the right to their own sovereign state. The state of Asom is one of many separatist 
movements in Northeast region, with others being Meghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal 
Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland. 
Throughout its existence, ULFA has engaged in numerous horizontal alliances.  
Domestically, they have exchanged arms and training with groups such as The Muslim United 
Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). 
They formed these same relationships with terrorist groups abroad, such as the Sri Lankan 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  Across borders, they have found safe havens from 
the government in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Burma), often hosting training camps in 
these states (SATP 2020a). 
In 1990, ULFA first considered moving beyond these horizontal relationships and 
affiliating with a parent organization. The group contemplated joining the Indo-Burma 
Revolutionary Front (IBRF), a parent organization seeking a pan-Mongoloid coalition.  The 
IBRF was made up of groups such as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of India and 
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the Kuki National Army (KNA) of Burma, all seeking to “wage a united struggle for the 
independence of Indo-Burma” (SATP 2020b).   
Operating out of Myanmar (Burma), the parent organization failed to make progress and 
quickly fell apart (Bureau 2015). The potential for a crackdown while operating in Myanmar in 
1990 was fairly low. The government was in the midst of turmoil after national elections saw 
80% of the vote go to the opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD).  The 
military regime refused to recognize these results, instead arresting dozens of opposition 
parliamentarians and cracking down on political protests (HRW 2015).  In light of this focus on 
maintaining the capital, the IBRF, who were operating in in the peripheral regions, were allowed 
to operate with minimal interference from the Myanmar government (Bhattacharya 2018).   
This freedom led to a noted lack of trust among the diverse groups forming the IBRF 
(TRAC 2020).  With no group having to pay high costs to join, it was difficult to disentangle the 
motives.  Ultimately, accusations were made that individual groups were merely using affiliation 
as a means to traffic guns and drugs across the border, rather than to unite and fight for the entire 
Indo-Burmese region (Bureau 2015). With no way to prove their commitment, the parent 
organization folded. 
 In 2011, a new parent organization formed named The United National Liberation Front 
of Western South East Asia (UNLFW) (Kalita 2015). The group formed with the express intent 
of ratcheting up the violence in the region amidst the backdrop of a weakening insurgency in 
Northeast India.  By 2015, several insurgent groups had signed cease fire agreements, inserting 
doubt into the future of the Northeast India insurgency campaigns. The UNLFW parent 
organization created a region-wide goal to connect rebel groups across the regions, stating their 
goal:  “to have a united and total struggle to liberate our ancestral homes situated in Western 
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South East Asia to secure our Sovereign political future from occupation and domination and 
march ahead in peace, progress and prosperity of the whole region." Immediately upon forming, 
the UNLFW fighters took part in the heaviest fighting the region had seen in 5 years (UCDP 
2020). 
 In light of this increased fighting and broader goal, especially at the same time as India 
was working towards sustained ceasefire agreements, the crackdown on the UNLFW was swift.  
Security forces were given sweeping shoot-to-kill powers in "disturbed areas" of the North East 
India region under controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act.  Affiliate groups who joined 
the UNLFW would come under the same fate (FirstPost 2015). 
 ULFA officially affiliated with the UNLFW in April 2015, signing a document along 
with three other affiliate groups.  The UNLFW eventually grew to 11 affiliates, though over 40 
groups seeking sovereignty in Northeast India are operational today (Kalita 2015). However, not 
all these groups are capable or willing to send the costly signal of affiliation.  Indeed, upon 
affiliation, ULFA saw a surgical strike by the Indian government destroy their long-standing 
training camps in the autonomous regions along the Myanmar border less than two months after 
signing the affiliation document (Banerjee 2018). 
However, ULFA reaped additional benefits by proving their commitment to the UNLFW, 
which they had not seen in the previous 40 years of conflict.  Their leader Paresh Baruah spoke 
of the new tactic the group is pursuing along with the UNLFW in 2018, stating, “We are 
reaching out to countries and international bodies like the United Nations in a big way, to boost 
opinion in our favour” (ibid).  This type of “rebel diplomacy” demonstrates a new willingness to 
seek operate in the international system and engage in the international politics of a civil war 
(Huang 2016).  
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Additionally, the group moved their safe haven to China.  China now allows this because 
of their interest in the destabilization of Indian domestic politics and the UNLFW’s newfound 
ability to affect this. With the clout of the UNLFW behind them, ULFA has moved their 
operations and training to the Chinese border region, where India is unwilling to utilize the 
shoot-to-kill privileges because of China’s global power status.  This is unlike in the autonomous 
regions of the Myanmar border, where ULFA previously operated and was attacked by Indian 
forces (Bhattacharya 2018). 
Baruah has also discussed ULFA’s growing ranks since joining the UNLFW.  They have 
drawn new members from both Asom and other Northeast India states, remarking “What 
surprises me is that the organisation that was almost dead is now heavily recruiting people.” 
According to intelligence officers, around 150 youth from Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and 
Nagaland have joined ULFA in 2018 alone (Banerjee 2018).  The broader goal promoted by the 
UNLFW allows ULFA to both revitalize their own recruiting efforts, as well as draw recruits 
from states outside of Asom. 
ULFA affiliated with the IBRF in 1990 but saw no benefits, as the IBRF failed shortly 
after its inception. Operating with near impunity in a chaotic Myanmar, there was little cost to 
joining the parent organization.  In light of this, the groups did not trust the motives of other 
affiliate groups.  With no way to prove commitment to the IBRF, the parent organization and 
supporters could not separate out the dedicated groups from those bluffing. 
 The UNLFW, conversely, has continued to thrive even amongst the high costs of 
affiliation.  The affiliate groups have united under the broader goal of sovereignty for all of 
Northeast India.  Groups’ willingness to risk the crackdown of affiliation, in the form of a shoot-
to-kill order, has led to benefits for ULFA from a broader audience, such as internationalization 
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of the cause and increased recruitment.  Again, when the costs are high enough to separate types, 






5. Evaluating the Mechanism: Experiment 
 
5.1 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
5.1.1 Main Results 
Hypothesis 3 states: When groups are affiliated with a parent organization, there is more 
counter- violence support from the public than when groups are unaffiliated.   
 To test this hypothesis, respondents were asked to read a vignette that gave basic 
information about the government’s opportunity to adjust their level of counterinsurgency effort.  
The treatment of interest is Affiliation.  The control vignette only gave information regarding 
general counterinsurgency efforts in the country (India or Pakistan).  The treatment vignette 
included information about groups affiliated with a parent organization working against the 
interests of the country. 
 After reading the vignette, respondents were asked to give their opinion on the level of 
counterinsurgency the government should pursue.  They were asked about two options: the 
number of personnel (whether military or police) the government should invest in 
counterinsurgency, as well as the monetary support the government should invest.  In each case, 
respondents were asked to answer on a 5-point scale, with 1 being no investment and 5 being the 
maximum investment possible.  The distribution of answers are shown in Figure 11 below, with 




Figure 11:   Distribution of Key Dependent Variables (Hypothesis 3)
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 In order to find support for Hypothesis 3, respondents who received the Affiliation 
treatment should, on average, prefer higher levels of counterinsurgency investments.  To assess 
these preferences, a series of two sample t-tests were used to test if the mean levels of preferred 
counterinsurgency are equal amongst the control (no affiliation) and treatment (affiliation) 
groups.  If the mean levels of preferred investment are significantly greater within the treated 
group, then Hypothesis 3 would be supported. 
 In relation to the theory, support for Hypothesis 3 would suggest that affiliation is indeed 
costly.  If the public generally supports more counterinsurgency measures when they are aimed 
at affiliate groups, then governments (particularly in these Democratic countries) can be induced 
into following public opinion on foreign policy, thus investing in and targeting these affiliate 
groups with harsher counterinsurgency measures. 
 Below, Tables 7 & 8 and Figures 12 & 13 provide support for Hypothesis 3.  Table 5 and 
Figure 12 exhibit the mean level of support for personnel investment amongst the No Affiliation 
(control) group and the Affiliation (treatment) group.  The mean level of preferred personnel is 
0.33 points higher within the treated group when compared to the control group, a statistically 
significant difference.  Thus, when respondents were given information about an affiliate group, 
they were significantly more likely to support investing more personnel towards 
counterinsurgency policies.  As evidenced in Table 6 and Figure 13, this result holds when 
respondents were asked about monetary investments as well.  Overall, these results suggest that 
public opinion on affiliation would lead to pressure for increased counterinsurgency investment 















3.19 3.52 -0.33 0.00  Monetary 
Support 
3.10 3.46 -0.36 0.00 
  




Figure 12:  Support for Personnel  Figure 13:  Support for Monetary Investment
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Hypothesis 4 states: Given a group pledged, when there is a potential for a successful 
crackdown, the more likely the parent organization’s audience is to support the affiliate group.   
 To test this hypothesis, respondents were again asked to read a vignette.  This vignette 
gave information about a foreign policy that could be implemented in their country.  The 
treatment of interest is endorsement by an affiliate group.  The control vignette only gave 
information regarding the general policy.  The treatment vignette included information about 
groups affiliated with a parent organization that were endorsing the policy. 
 I am interested in the way in which information about endorsement by a group can affect 
the level of support for a policy (and thus tacit support for the group).  This endorsement design 
is used because there is a social desirability bias, in which respondents don’t want to directly 
express support for a violent group.  Yet, I still expect overall low levels of support to exist in the 
countries, generally.  However, as discussed in previous chapters, respondents in conflict-
affected regions should be more willing to support the violent affiliate groups.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4 is examined amongst the whole sample, as well as amongst only those located in 
conflict-affected regions where support may be generally higher. 
 After reading the vignette, respondents were asked to provide a level of support for the 
policy on a 5-point scale, with 1 being no support and 5 being very supportive.  The distribution 
of responses is shown in Figure 14 below, with a mean level of support overall 3.81/5.00 and a 





Figure 14:  Distribution of Key Dependent Variables (Hypothesis 4)
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To test Hypothesis 4, respondents who received the endorsement treatment should, on 
average, support the policy more.  Yet, I only expect this result to hold within conflict-affected 
regions.  To assess these preferences, again a series of two sample t-tests were used to test if the 
mean levels of policy support are equal amongst the control (no endorsement) and treatment 
(endorsement) groups.  To support Hypothesis 4, the mean levels of policy support must be 
significantly higher within the treated group. 
 Below, Tables 9 & 10 and Figures 15 & 16 provide patterns of support for Hypothesis 4, 
though estimates all fail to reach statistical significance.  Table 7 and Figure 15 exhibit the mean 
level of support for policies amongst the No Endorsement (control) group and Endorsement 
(treatment) group amongst the entire survey population.  The mean level of support is 0.15 points 
higher with no endorsement, which is not a statistically significant difference.  This is an 
expected result, as the population in general is unlikely to support endorsing groups. 
As evidenced in Table 8 and Figure 16, this result does not hold when limiting the sample 
to only respondents in conflict-affected regions.  Respondents in these regions are more likely by 
0.18 points to support the policy when it is endorsed by a group, though this result closely fails to 
reach statistical significance.  By leveraging geographically targeted sampling, potential patterns 
of support for affiliate groups begin to emerge. Respondents in general do not support these 




 No Endorsement Endorsement Difference P-Value 
Proposal 
Support 
3.89 3.74 0.15 0.13 
Table 9:  Policy Support among Full Sample                           
 No Endorsement Endorsement Difference P-Value 
Table 10:  Policy Support in Conflict-Affected Regions  
 
Figure 15: Policy Support among Full Sample      Figure 16:   Policy Support in Conflict-Affected  




Importantly, the theory suggests that support for these affiliate groups is generated by the 
costly signal mechanism.  In half of the vignette responses, respondents were provided 
information about the endorsing affiliate groups.  Half of these respective respondents were told 
that the affiliate groups had ties (religious, ethnic, or ideological) to the region in which the 
policy was proposed.  The other half received information about a costly signal, being told the 
affiliate groups could face a crackdown for their actions.   
According to the theory, this costly signal mechanism should drive support for the policy 
(and thus the affiliate groups) more so than shared ties.  Indeed, as evidence in Table 11 and 
Figure 17, respondents who received the costly signal mechanism supported the policy by 0.39 
points more, a statistically significant difference.  This suggests that potential supporters in these 












3.87 4.26 -0.39 0.01 
 
Table 11:  Policy Support (Shared Ties vs. Costly Signal Mechanism) 
 
 
Figure 17:   Policy Support (Shared Ties vs. Costly Signal Mechanism)
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5.1.2 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
 I order to establish causal identification and explore subgroup differences, I briefly 
examine other variables to ensure that the affiliation treatments were driving results.  First, in 
Vignette 1, respondents were given information about violent groups operating from either their 
home country (local) or a neighboring country (international).  Support for (or against) these 
groups may be contingent on their relative location to the respondent.  However, Table 12 below 
finds no significant difference between local or international locations of the group. 
 Second, as evidenced in Table 13, Vignette 1 respondents not residing in conflict-affected 
regions were statistically more likely to favor higher levels of counterinsurgency action from 
their governments, measured both as personnel and monetary resource increases.  This gives 
further credence to the results surrounding Hypothesis 4.  If respondents in conflict-affected 
regions favor less counterinsurgency, they should be more willing to in turn be open to 
supporting political violence groups. 
 Third, respondents who found the issues presented in the vignettes were more likely to 
favor increased counterinsurgency measures (Table 14) or to favor the proposal (Table 16).  This 
is in line with expectations that respondents who care about an issue will favor action. Lastly, in 
terms of which issue respondents were presented with, results are mixed.  When asked about 
support for personnel, there is no significant difference between the answers of respondents 
presented with Kashmir issues versus other issues.  Yet, respondents presented with Kashmir 
issues supported significantly less monetary resources (Table 15).  However, when asked about a 
Kashmir-specific policy proposal (Table 17), respondents were more likely to support the 
proposal than other issue areas. 
Lastly, the biggest advantage of experiments is the causal inferences that can be made.  
Many model designs (such as regression) suffer from the problems of confounders—factors that 
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could affect both the independent and dependent variables and thus be driving the results.  
However, when the randomization of an experiment is implemented correctly, there should be no 
systematic tendency for one type of each factor to be in control or treatment group.  We can 
assume that both observed and unobserved factors are equally likely to be in both groups, thus 
producing unbiased estimates with which causal claims can be made (Druckman and Kam in 
Druckman et al. 2011).  
To check that the randomization assignment worked, I utilize a randomization check on 
observed demographic questions.  I regress each respective treatment on these covariates.  I 
utilize a logit for the binary treatments.  Table 18 below shows no significance among the 
coefficients, indicating no systematic relationship between the covariates and treatments.  
Accordingly, I proceeded with my analysis assessing the relationships with a series of bivariate 
tests, assuming confounders are not an issue for unbiased estimates.
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 Local International Difference P-Value 
Personnel Support 3.40 3.31 0.09 0.23 
Monetary Support 3.30 3.25 0.05 0.61 







Personnel Support 3.44 3.27 0.17 0.04 
Monetary Support 3.37 3.20 0.17 0.06 







Personnel Support 2.99 3.50 -0.51 0.00 
Monetary Support 2.87 3.44 -0.57 0.00 




Kashmir Issue Difference P-Value 
Personnel Support 3.26 3.11 0.15 0.18 
Monetary Support 3.27 3.04 0.23 0.07 







Proposal Support 3.37 4.11 -0.74 0.00 







Proposal Support 3.61 3.98 -0.37 0.00 




 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Vin 1 Affiliation Vin 2 Affiliation 
   
Female 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
Religion -0.00 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
US proclivity -0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Region -0.06 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Age -0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Conflict Region 0.06 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Democracy view 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Education 0.02 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Finances -0.01 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Politics -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
India -0.03 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 0.56*** 0.70*** 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
   
Observations 1,056 1,056 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 18:  Randomization Check
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5.2 EXPERIMENT IMPLICATIONS 
Overall, this experiment provides building blocks for moving forward.  Vignette 1, in 
which respondents gave their level of support for counter political violence measures (personnel 
or monetary resources), provides support for the assumption that affiliation is indeed costly.  
When respondents received the treatment of knowing the counterinsurgency forces would go 
towards groups affiliated with a well-known parent organization, they were significantly more 
likely to favor high levels of personnel or monetary investment. This suggest that affiliation does 
indeed have the potential to garner a greater crackdown. 
Vignette 2, in which respondents gave their level of support for a policy issue, provides 
limited support for Hypothesis 4. Overall, the level of support for policies with an endorsing 
group is not higher than support when there is no endorsing group.  This is as suspected with 
national samples (all of Pakistan and all of India), in which support for political violence groups 
is generally low.  However, when only examining support among respondents located in a 
conflict-affected region, this result flips.  Most importantly, when probing the mechanism behind 
the higher levels of support in conflicted-affected regions, respondents were most likely to 
support a policy with an endorsing group if that group faced a costly potential crackdown.  This 
provides initial evidence that respondents do indeed recognize and react to the costly signal 
mechanism proposed. 
In these designs, vignettes were geographically targeted to ensure that respondents were 
receiving information about policies and groups that were relevant, familiar, and important to 
them.  Furthermore, respondents in conflict-affected regions were over-sampled.  This helps 
ensure that potential supporters of affiliate groups and parent organizations, who are more likely 
to reside in these regions, are sampled. 
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Future iterations of this survey experiment could improve upon the design.  First, a larger 
sample with greater power could allow for a broader range of policies and affiliate groups with 
their parent organizations to be utilized to help test the extent to which the specific parent 
organization drives results.  Initial results highlighted in Tables 12 & 14 are inconclusive as to 
how much issue areas drive results.  Additionally, a larger sample could allow for the expansion 
of the scope of the project beyond South Asia.   
Second, interviews with both policy makers and respondents could help better define the 
mechanisms.  Policy makers could help clarify the link between public opinion and their actions.  
What role do affiliations and the publics knowledge or perception of these relationships shape 
their actions?  Further, if the survey was administered by enumerators, they could ask follow-up 
questions to better understand why respondents answered the way they did.  Did respondents 
pick up on the role of affiliate groups?  The experiment necessarily abstracts away from asking 
directly about support for political violence groups, so any further probing can be enlightening. 
Given the natural social desirability bias in surveys about political violence, an 
alternative design could also prove informative. For example, a design in which respondents 
actually got the opportunity to pick a charity to donate money to would be more indicative of 
tangible support than self-reported support for a policy.  By linking charities to well-known 
clerics or leaders who support affiliate groups and parent organizations, the actual action of 





6. Empirical II: Further Effects on Violence18 
6.1 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
According to the theory, when the potential costs of a crackdown post-pledging are high 
enough, the act of pledging can act as a costly signal.  This is represented by the separating and 
semi-separating equilibrium in Figure 1 below.  However, when the costs are low, there exists a 
pooling equilibrium in which all groups (or significantly more groups, empirically) can pledge, 
because the cost to bluff is so low.  This is when groups will have to outbid one another post-
pledging in order to distinguish themselves.  
In the case of al-Qaeda as a parent organization, when groups pledge allegiance, they 
become part of the parent organization’s shared goal.  They can now compete for resources from 
those Salafi-jihadists who wish to follow this very well-known goal (Byman, 2012).  It is a 
choice to pledge, and not all Salafi terrorist groups do. However, when the market becomes over-
saturated and those pledged groups face competition for support from this audience, they follow 
an outbidding pattern of violence to distinguish their group.
 
18 A version of this chapter is published: Farrell, Megan (2020). The Logic of Transnational Outbidding: Pledging 





Figure 18:  Equilibrium Space
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More specifically, when groups pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda, they adopt the parent 
organization’s specific goal based on Salafi-jihadist ideology.  This is a more defined shared 
ideology.  New pledges often must publicly declare bay’at, or allegiance, to their parent 
organization, so they are aware of their direct competition (Byman, 2014).  Though all Salafi-
jihadists seek to re-establish the Caliphate, there is often disagreement on exactly what the 
ideology entails.  al-Qaeda has been consistent about their ultimate goal – a pan-Islamic 
caliphate built through anti-western rhetoric and attacks (Jones, 2014).  ISIS, conversely, seeks 
to hold land in order to immediately establish the caliphate (Wood, 2015).  Non-affiliated Salafi-
jihadists often prioritize forming their own, local Salafi empire when operating without a parent 
organization (Byman, 2010).   
By choosing to pledge, more support and resources, such as foreign fighters and foreign 
financing from those following the specific goal of al-Qaeda, can further be secured by affiliate 
groups. Those wanting to fight the brand of Salafi-jihadism that al-Qaeda popularized often send 
their support to affiliate groups carrying on this fight, as the core parent organizations carry out 
less and less of their own attacks (Byman, 2012).   
While affiliates can still recruit locally and seek out resources from traditional external 
sources, such as state sponsorship, affiliation gives them access to an even more valuable 
transnational audience based on this ideology.  These international resources coming from 
individuals are fairly unique to this type of transnational terrorism. For example, individuals 
radicalized at home by al-Qaeda websites can now join a group as a foreign fighter (Malet, 
2013). No geographical ties are necessary, and the worldwide goal is more accessible to 
individual fighters and funders. These unique resources are furthermore very valuable. The most 
capable foreign fighters or the best endowed funders want to make the most impact.  Like any 
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labor market, they want to fight for the most capable group in the best arena. al-Qaeda have 
established this well-known brand that groups can cultivate over the years (Mendelsohn, 2016). 
Accordingly, when the costs of pledging lowered in 2011 (see Figure 19 and  Chapter 2 
for further discussion), there was a sharp increase in the number of pledged groups.  This period 
is when we observe this outbidding pattern.  Even though groups must send this extra outbidding 
signal when the market is saturated, the value of the al-Qaeda resources discussed above is so 
great and unique, committed groups are willing to do so when necessary. While pledging matters 
as a signal, the count of pledged groups (or the level of competition) has further implications.  
These effects can be observed in the number of types of attacks groups choose to undertake post-




Figure 19:  # Pledged groups by year 
 
Hypothesis 5 states: When the costs of pledging lessen starting in 2011, pledged groups 
commit more attacks as competition rises. I find strong support for this interactive effect among 
pledged groups.  Figure 3 displays the predicted number of events as the number of groups 
actually pledged to al-Qaeda fluctuates.19  As discussed, we should expect groups that have 
pledged (pledge=1) to respond the most to increases in competition during times when the costs 
of pledging are lowest.  This corresponds to the time period of 2011-2014, as discussed in 
chapter 2.  Figure 19 demonstrates that during this time period, 12 or greater groups were 
pledged to al-Qaeda. 
 
19 Given the interest is # of attacks at different levels of competition, I present the results graphically.  A full 
regression table can be found in the Appendix. 
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As evidenced in Figure 20, when costs of pledging were high pre-2011, there are low 
levels of competition along the X-axis.  The outbidding effect does not exist during this time 
period, as a small number of attacks by any given group is predicted.  Additionally, when 
competition is low, pledged and non-pledged groups are not statistically distinguishable.  This is 
in line with the theory that pledging served as a credible signal during this time period when the 
costs imposed upon pledged groups were high. No further outbidding signal of strength was 
needed. 
However, as costs lower and competition grows, groups that are currently pledged to al-
Qaeda respond the most.  In 2012, when 13 Salafi-jihadi groups were pledged to al-Qaeda, these 
pledged groups are expected to commit more attacks compared to non-pledged Salafi-jihadist 
groups, a significant difference.  In 2013 when 19 groups were pledged, the highest level of 
competition observed, pledged groups are predicted to commit over double the amount of attacks 
as non-pledged Salafi-jihadist groups. Evidence for an interactive effect between # Pledged 
Groups and pledging on the number of suicide attacks (Hypothesis 6) is not statistically 












Again, I explore the interactive effect of competition and pledging in relation to severity 
of attacks.  Figure 21 provides support for Hypothesis 7, in which I expect pledged groups in the 
most competitive environments (post-2011 when 12+ groups are pledged) to conduct the most 
severe attacks.  In Figure 21, when competition is low, the probability a group selects the most 
severe type of attack is below 20% among both pledged and non-pledged groups.  However, as 
competition grows among al-Qaeda pledges to 19 groups, pledged groups are more than 60% 
likely to select the most severe type of attack.  This is significantly distinguishable from non-
pledged groups, which are only 30% likely to select the most severe type of attack when 
competition is at its highest.20  This same effect holds when assessing ‘shock value’ as more 
extreme target selection.  Overall, there is a strong interactive effect indicating pledged groups, 
who are in direct competition with one another, must resort to outbidding when competition 
becomes overly saturated due to lower costs of pledging.
 





      Figure 21:     Predicted attack severity by pledged group status 
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6.2 ILLUSTRATIVE CASE 
I include an illustrative case below that traces the mechanism through one organization.  I 
look at a specific group, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB), colloquially known as al-Qaeda 
in Lebanon, as a way to isolate the mechanism of transnational outbidding.  Following 
Lieberman (2005), because the results of the large-n statistical analysis conformed to my 
hypotheses, I pick an ‘on-the-line’ case for a small-N analyses to assess the plausibility of 
observed statistical relationships between variables.  As it has existed since 2004, its behavior 
can be observed before and after pledging, which further aids in causal inference.   
According to the mechanism, AAB should respond to competition to the most extreme 
degree when they are pledged and when the number of pledged groups is high.  They must 
increase their visibility in order to demonstrate their capabilities and shift resources to their own 
conflict arena.  In turn, they should receive resources from al-Qaeda’s audience in response to 
this outbidding activity.  Indeed, AAB altered its strategy and increased its attacks and severity 
post-pledging in response to rising competition, and correspondingly received increased 
resources. 
 AAB formed in 2004, undertaking a few minor attacks in the Sinai Peninsula in 2004 and 
2005.  They ceased violent operations until 2009, when they returned and pledged allegiance to 
al-Qaeda (Mackenzie Institute, 2015).  This action was met with immediate counterterrorism 
initiatives from countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia naming their leader to their most-
wanted lists (Barnett 2013).  AAB initially abided by bin Laden’s instructions to affiliate groups 
to rein in violence against civilians (Lahoud, 2013).  With competition at a lower level in 2009 
and 2010, the group specifically called for peaceful protests in Syria against the al-Assad 
government, with its leader Majid bin Muhammad al Majid pleading, ‘Stay away from that 
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which repulses people and makes them stop demonstrating and stop supporting the peaceful and 
armed revolution’ (Roggio, 2012).  This brought them favor with bin Laden and helped them 
secure finances and fighters post-pledging (Barnett 2013). 
However, after other al-Qaeda affiliate groups, such as the al-Nursa Front and Ahrar al-
Sham, entered the Salafi-jihad fight starting in late 2011, AAB switched their tactics.  The videos 
calling for peace ceased.  These new affiliate groups were known to be excessively violent, with 
the al-Nursa Front heavily utilizing suicide attacks and Ahrar al-Sham known to target Syrian 
soldiers (Roggio, 2013; Cassman, 2019). Furthermore, there was known to be a great 
competition among these groups, with al-Zawahiri having to step in to stop the infighting 
amongst pledged groups more than once.  al-Zawahiri even went as far as to threaten the 
formation of an arbitration body to address competition between groups who should be acting as 
‘brothers’ (ICT, 2013).   
These groups entered the pledging arena in 2011, when the costs of an associated 
crackdown lowered significantly. With only pledging not working anymore to distinguish AAB 
from these other groups, al Majid stopped calling for restraint and the group switched to more 
violent measures.  For example, the group undertook a suicide attack in Syria in late 2011, 
killing 40 people. Majid released a notable statement urging jihadists to follow him in taking up 
arms to defeat the apostates in early 2012.  Since then, AAB have upped the quantity and 
severity of its attacks.  They are responsible for several deadly, high-profile attacks all around 
the Middle East.  In 2012, a suicide bomber attacked a police station in Pakistan.  In Beirut in 
2013, suicide bombers from AAB struck again, killing 22 at the Iranian embassy (BBC, 2013).  
This international pattern of attacks lends further evidence to a transnational outbidding 
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campaign, rather than outbidding within the group’s home country or within the context of a civil 
war, such as Syria. 
Beyond these specific attacks, AAB’s general pattern of attack quantities and severity 
have followed the trend of al-Qaeda affiliates outbidding one another as competition grew.  
Figure 22 demonstrates AAB’s attack quantity in response to competition by year.  The number 
of pledged groups by year is in black, with the number of AAB attacks by year in gray.  At the 
time of pledging, competition was at a low level.  There were 6 pledged affiliates to al-Qaeda in 
2009 and 7 in 2010. Correspondingly, the group undertook few attacks.  This was in line with the 
directives of its parent organization.   
Starting in 2011, there was a sharp increase in competition, with the number of pledged 
groups rising to 12.  Again, these groups in the competition, such as the al-Nursa Front and 
Ahrar al-Sham, were also excessively violent.  AAB correspondingly switched their tactics to 
more violence in response to this pressure by other affiliates and more than doubled their number 
of attacks per year in 2011 and increased fourfold by 2013. 21
 
21 In the Appendix, Figure provides evidence of the same pattern with the alternative independent variable 






Figure 22:  AAB attack quantity and competition, 2004-2014
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Given both competition and AAB’s outbidding patterns of violence increased in 2011, we 
should observe an influx of resources, such as funding and foreign fighters, starting in 2011 and 
growing as the group becomes more visible with its increased violence.  Notably, these resources 
did not come until the switch in tactics, even though the group pledged in 2009.  This is because 
the visibility of the group greatly increased after they began outbidding.  The group became so 
prolific for both its fundraising ability and as a destination for foreign fighters, the United States 
added AAB to the list of foreign terrorists in 2013 (Reuters, 2014). 
In a 2011 video after AAB’s first massively violent attack in Syria, Majid thanked the 
new ‘philanthropists and Muslim merchants’ that funded the group and urged them to give more.  
Furthermore, it is estimated more than 1,000 foreign fighters joined the group in 2011 after this 
attack.  AAB had not previously been a destination for foreign fighters (Mortada, 2012).  This 
uptick in resources continued as AAB’s violence grew in response to further increases in 
competition and the notoriety of the group increased.  The group not only continued to receive 
foreign fighters, but specifically was able to recruit fighters with French citizenship (Naharnet, 
2014).  The ability to recruit Western foreign fighters is a sign of prestige for al-Qaeda and ISIS 
affiliates (Weiss & Hassan, 2015).  With an increased profile, AAB also continued to broaden its 
fundraising.  By 2014, they expanded beyond their home country, using Kuwait as a central 
location for a wide array of fundraising goals, including funding anti-Assad forces in Syria and 
anti-Hezbollah forces in Lebanon and Palestine (Reuters, 2014).   
 In sum, as competition increased, AAB switched their attack patterns to follow an 
outbidding model.  Because the costs of pledging were lower, allowing more groups to pledge, 
AAB had to differentiate themselves in order to receive the resources they sought as an affiliate 
of al-Qaeda.  While the separating equilibrium give insight to the initial decision to affiliate, the 
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case of al-Qaeda and AAB demonstrate the more unique circumstance when costs lower and 
pledging no longer serves as a reliable signal.  As discussed in the conclusion, these findings can 
give us policy insights into counterterrorism and counterinsurgency initiatives governments can 







At its core, this dissertation asks the question of: why do political violence groups makes 
the choice to affiliate with a parent organization?  This act of affiliation is puzzling because once 
a group affiliates with a better-known parent organization, they open themselves up to the same 
crackdown their parent organization faces.  Indeed, groups that affiliate with al-Qaeda or ISIS 
are subjected to mandatory UN sanctions.  Groups that affiliate with the UNLFW in Northeast 
India come under shoot-to-kill orders. 
I present a theoretical argument which contends groups leverage these high costs in order 
to demonstrate their commitment to the parent organization.  When groups pledge allegiance to a 
parent organization, they have the potential to receive new resources from the parent 
organization and the audience that follows them.  Parent Organizations cultivate a broad base of 
support, as they have an expanded goal which extends beyond their own local group needs.  For 
example, al-Qaeda has generated a transnational Salafi Islam ideology which generates a global 
audience of potential supporters.  The UNLFW fights for the sovereignty rights of all groups in 
Northeast India, rather than just their own group’s rights.  This garners them a transnational or 
regional audience and grows the base of potential supporters.  These potential supporters can 
funnel resources, such as fighters, finances, or public support and legitimacy, to political 
violence groups that affiliate with the parent organization with whom the supporters align. 
Yet, because these resources are so valuable, there is a strong incentive for affiliate 
groups to bluff.  A group could pledge allegiance to a parent organization in order to receive 
resources, yet not subscribe to or pursue the expanded goals (e.g. transnational Salafi Islam or 
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regional Sovereignty rights) that the parent organization and its audience are pursuing.  This is 
not preferable to the parent organization nor its audience. 
Utilizing a formal model in Chapter 2, I demonstrate that affiliation can serve as a costly 
signal of a group’s commitment.  When the costs of affiliation are high enough, only groups that 
are committed to the parent organization’s expanded goals are willing to send the signal of 
affiliation and risk the associated crackdown.  Affiliation serves as a mechanism to separate out 
types of groups.  When a group chooses to pledge allegiance, they give information to the parent 
organization and its audience of potential supporters from which they can update their priors 
about the type of group which is affiliating.  The groups that are willing to send the signal of 
affiliation and risk the costs can demonstrate their commitment.  Thus, the supporters can know 
with greater certainty they are dealing with their preferred type of group and are willing to send 
resources to the affiliate. 
Chapter 4 finds empirical support for this costly signal mechanism.  Utilizing data 
collected to measure the affiliations present between rebel, terrorist, and militia groups in India, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan from 1970 through 2015, I find support for two observable 
implications of the formal model.  First, the potential costs of a crackdown from both domestic 
and international governments dictate the decision to affiliate, in general.  On average, as the 
potential costs of a crackdown rise, groups are less likely to affiliate.  The general group is not 
willing or unable to bear these high costs. 
Second, I examine the which groups do indeed choose to affiliate, finding that as costs 
increase, the expanded groups are significantly more likely to be the type of group that actually 
do affiliate.  As the signal becomes costlier to send, local groups are not willing to pay those 
costs to bluff.  At these higher costs, only the committed or expanded types are willing to send 
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this affiliation signal and incur these potential costs.  Indeed, studying the interaction between 
the level of potential costs and the choice to affiliate, I find that groups that choose to affiliate at 
higher costs are significantly more likely to have an expanded goal types. 
In sum, affiliation as a signal can mitigate the circumstances in which groups will try to 
bluff and pretend to be committed to the parent organization through stating their goals as 
expanded even when they are local.  The signal of affiliation can demonstrate that a group is 
willing to pay costs in order to demonstrate they are the committed type, allowing potential 
supporters to send resources to affiliate groups they presume to be the type of groups they want 
to support. 
Two fundamental assumptions underwrote these findings:  First, that governments in fact 
do have a greater potential to impose crackdown costs on groups post-affiliation.  Second, the 
audience of potential supporters recognizes this potential crackdown as a costly signal and this is 
the mechanism behind these supporters offering resources to groups post-affiliation, rather tan 
other ties to the group. 
Chapter 5 utilizes a survey experiment to probe these assumptions further.  Because 
asking respondents about their support for political violence groups will be affected by biases, 
such as social desirability bias, I use designs intended to mitigate these biases. The surveys were 
distributed to ~1,000 respondents in India and Pakistan in July 2019.  Respondents were given 
information about policies and asked to respond with their support-level.  Information was 
manipulated in different versions of the vignettes as the treatment. 
First, to explore the costs of a crackdown associated with affiliation, I utilize a vignette 
that asks respondents to quantify their support for counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency 
resources implemented by their home government.  They were given different information about 
130 
 
whether the groups threatening the security of their country were affiliated with a parent 
organization or not. Because I cannot directly ask if respondents support these affiliated groups 
more, I instead investigate the degree to which they support investing in resources to counter 
these groups.  I find that, across the general samples, respondents support increased counter-
terrorism or insurgency measures if they received information about affiliate groups.  This 
indicates that affiliation is indeed costly, as affiliate groups will face harsher measures. 
The second vignette utilized an endorsement design, in which respondents were asked 
about support for a policy proposal.  Whether that policy was endorsed by a parent organization 
and its affiliates was randomly manipulated. Further, if the affiliate groups had religious or other 
cultural ties to the region (another possible mechanism of support) or if the affiliates were facing 
backlash for their actions (a costly signal) was manipulated.  I find limited support for the 
hypothesis that respondents will recognize this costly signal and offer more support for policies 
with an endorsing group.  This result only holds among respondents in conflict-affected regions, 
though these are the locations of respondents that should be expected to support political 
violence groups at higher rates, as they are more directly affected by conflict.  Though neither 
design is able to directly test the assumptions of the model, both provide initial support that the 
mechanisms proposed are indeed present. 
 Chapter 6 extends upon the core question to ask: what are the effects on the violent 
attacks of groups post-pledging?  Leveraging the uniqueness of the al-Qaeda sample, particularly 
post-2011, I explore the changes in patterns of violence among al-Qaeda affiliates as the level of 
competition (or number of affiliate groups) fluctuates.  When the costs of affiliation were low, I 
find an increase in the number of pledged groups, mapping onto the pooling equilibrium.  
Because the market of affiliate groups was too crowded, affiliation in its own right did not serve 
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as a signal with enough information to distinguish committed groups from bluffing groups.  The 
audience could not know which groups to send resources to.  Thus, groups had to find alternative 
ways to send a signal to differentiate themselves in order to get resources during this time period.  
This is in line with the pooling equilibrium, in which affiliation is not actually a signal. 
 I find evidence of transnational outbidding among al-Qaeda affiliate groups when 
competition was at its highest levels.  By changing the numbers and intensity of their attacks, 
groups could use their attack profiles to distinguish themselves.  More spectacular attacks 
demonstrate the higher capabilities of the group, allowing supporters to decide which affiliate 
group to send resources to based on this signal in addition to the affiliation signal. 
 In the rest of this chapter, I discuss three broader implications of this dissertation.  First, I 
highlight the policy implications.  Second, I discuss the impact of understanding affiliation, or 
vertical alliances, on the conventional alliance literature within the civil conflict arena.  Lastly, 
moving beyond the typical focus on the relationships between states as the focus of IR literature, 
I discuss the implications of this theory on the traditional state-building literature. 
7.2 BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
7.2.1 Policy Implications 
The case of al-Qaeda can help highlight a key policy implication of this theory, given that 
al-Qaeda’s choice to accept pledges or not has long been a focal point of the counterterrorism 
literature on affiliation.  Policy makers have projected three potential paths for the al-Qaeda 
affiliate network: A strong core, an affiliate-driven network, and a dispersed al-Qaeda led by 
“lone wolves.”  Each paradigm suggests a different counterterrorism approach. 
A strong, centralized core would dictate a policy in which the central leadership of al-
Qaeda is targeted and attacked. By degrading the hub, the spokes would be cut off from the 
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leader and be forced to operate more independently.  An affiliate-led network suggests the need 
to disperse counterterrorism tools and try to mitigate attacks on the homeland.  By containing 
affiliate attacks to their local region, governments can limit their reach.  A lone wolf version of 
al-Qaeda would necessitate each government utilizing their own domestic tools to track and stop 
local individuals.  Yet, these three paths do not account for the audience, or potential supports, of 
the parent organization’s brand and their ability to send resources to affiliate groups (Nelson & 
Sanderson 2011). 
Scenario one assumes affiliate resources only come directly from the parent organization.  
Scenario two assumes affiliate resources are all local.  Scenario three is focused only on 
individual’s choice to join in the first place and not as relevant to this theory.  In each case, the 
expanded goals of the parent organization and their ability to use this brand to generate a broad 
base of supporters who can transcend local group or geographical borders is not considered.  
Consequently, this unnecessarily narrows the argument to whether the core (hub) or affiliates 
(spokes) should be targeted. 
Yet, as demonstrated by this theory, there are actors involved beyond just the parent 
organization and the affiliate group.  The audience and their set of valuable resources plays a key 
role in the decision to affiliate.  They generate the base of support cultivated by the parent 
organization which makes the parent organization desirable in the first place.  They also 
distribute these resources to the affiliate group, which makes affiliation worth the risk.   
By moving away from the binary decision of targeting the hub or the spokes, new 
counterterrorism options arise.  Policy makers can focus on cutting off the flow of resources 
from the audience of the parent organization to the affiliate groups.  Cutting of these resources 
will take away the incentive to affiliate in the first place.  Affiliation would always be too costly 
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if these resources did not exist.  By eliminating these relationships before they begin, rather than 
deciding to direct initiatives at one side (the parent organization or the affiliates) after the fact, 
the policy can influence both sides simultaneously. The parent organization will be affected by 
not getting affiliates in the first place.  The affiliates will be affected by not getting the chance to 
increase their resources.  In sum, considering the outside actor (the supporters) can open new 
avenues of often less-violent policies that pre-empt affiliation rather than trying to catch up to the 
relationship after it is formed. 
7.2.2 Implications for Alliances in Civil Conflict 
 This theory has implications beyond counterterrorism or al-Qaeda specific concerns. 
First, there are considerably more strategic factors that determine this decision to form a vertical 
alliance, as we see with affiliation.  Previous literature utilized ideas like shared identity or 
power considerations as the building blocks for why groups form alliances.   As a result, 
alliances in the civil conflict literature are often viewed as agreements to maximize the chance of 
winning and to secure the best outcome after conflict.  But two key issues arise with this 
thinking.  
First, while notions that groups with the same identity or ideology or groups that need to 
increase their power will form alliances together gives us a baseline condition for the formation 
of these relationships, they do not shed light on the specific conditions under which groups 
would choose not to form an alliance.  For example, if a group in a civil war seeks to over throw 
the domestic leader, these theories would bring a basic understanding as to why that group would 




But the choice to not form an alliance, especially under circumstances where it has 
benefits, is just as strategic.  In exploring the depth of these alliances beyond a horizontal level, I 
offer a possible explanation.  Groups who do not want to or cannot pay the costs associated with 
joining an alliance with a parent organization, even though they share an ideology and have the 
potential for resource accumulation, will choose to not pursue this relationship.  
Second, the groups that form horizontal alliances are often interchangeable.  For 
example, any shared ideology could generate an alliance or any group can be part of a coalition, 
as long as it helps meets the minimum winning criteria.  The specific groups have much less 
importance.  Yet, the relationship between parent organizations and their affiliates demonstrates 
the specific group is integral to the decision to join a vertical alliance.  It is the parent 
organizations better-known brand and their ability to leverage this brand to develop a broad base 
of supporters with a wealth of potential resources which makes affiliation desirable in the first 
place, even in the midst of high costs of a crackdown.  In leveraging the depth of ties, we have 
deeper understanding into the role specific groups play in generating and maintaining these 
alliances. 
7.2.3 Implications for International Relations Theory 
International Relations (IR) theory traditionally focuses on relationships between states.  
Starting with Waltz’s (1979) theory of international politics, debates within the paradigms of IR 
focused on if the assertion of anarchy as a driving factor behind the interactions between states 
and if this assumption is tenable.  Accordingly, the theories of state-building in IR traditionally 
rely on how negotiations of institutional orders by states in the international system can 
overcome the effects of anarchy. 
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However, this theory explores how political violence groups, operating within states and 
challenging their own domestic governments as well as other governments beyond their borders, 
affects this same state-building process.  States form alliances, coalitions, and hierarchies as a 
means to increase capacity and legitimacy in pursuance of state-building.  Through vertical 
alliances, political violence groups increase their own capacity and legitimacy to challenge this 
same process, both within their own state and transnationally.   
The negotiations of institutional orders affecting state-building between states can also 
include political violence groups, nested in layers below the state-to-state.  This theory falls in 
line with a growing body of literature within the civil conflict arena asserting that these groups 
have the potential to redefine the structure from below.  Affiliation can serve as a mechanism for 












Chapter 2 Appendix 
 
Proposition 1: Semi-separating  
If G has expanded goals, G pledges 
If G has local goals, G pledges with probability r* and ~ pledge with probability 1-r*. 
If G ~ pledge, A believes G is local type (Φ’=0) and ~ support 
If G pledges, A believes Φ’=μ and supports with probability f* and ~ support with probability  
1-f* 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Begin with the local type of G with goal x, rendered indifferent by A’s strategy of randomizing 
whether to support after a pledge, such that EUG(pledge|𝑥) = EUG(~ pledge|𝑥).  That requires the 
probability of A supporting after a pledge (f): 
 







ensuring f* between [0,1], it must be the case that: 
 




Next, verifying that the expanded type of G will pledge:   
    EUG(pledge|𝑥) ≥ EUG(~ pledge|𝑥).  
 
Given A’s strategy, this inequality is satisfied when: 
𝑓∗(𝑥(𝜌 + 𝑣 + 𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑓∗)(𝑥(𝜌 + 𝑣) − 𝑐) ≥ 𝑥(𝑝) 
 
Which is true by assumption as long as 𝑥 > 𝑥 
 
 Next, given G’s strategies, we verify that A’s beliefs are consistent and strategies are 
optimal.  If G ~ pledge, A believes G to be local type (Φ’=0) and will not support, implying 
EUA(~ support|~ pledge) ≥ EUA (support|~ pledge), represented by: 
 
𝜋𝑥(𝜌) ≥ 𝜋𝑥(𝜌 + 𝜎) − 𝑘  
which is true when: 
𝑘 ≥ 𝜋𝑥(𝜎) 
 
 Lastly, if G pledges, A is rendered indifferent between support and ~ support by the 
probability with which the local type pledges (r*), such that  
EUA(support | pledge) = EUA (~support | pledge).  By Bayes’ Rule, A’s posterior belief that G is 
an expanded goal type is: 
Φ′ =  
Φ
Φ + (1 − Φ)r
≡  𝜇 
therefore, A is indifferent when: 
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𝜇(𝜋𝑥(𝜌 + 𝑣 + 𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑘) + (1 − 𝜇)(𝜋𝑥(𝜌 + 𝑣 + 𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑘)
=  𝜇(𝜋𝑥(𝜌 + 𝑣) + (1 − 𝜇) (𝜋𝑥(𝜌 + 𝑣)) 
which yields the local group’s probability of pledging: 
𝑟 ∗ =
Φ(𝜋𝑥(𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑘)
−(1 − Φ)(π𝑥(𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑘)
 
 
ensuring r*  between [0,1],  





Proposition 2: separating 
G pledges if expanded goals 
G ~ pledge if local goals  
If G pledges, A believes Φ′ = 1 and supports 
If G ~ pledge, A believes Φ′ = 0 and ~ support 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The expanded group pledges when UG(pledge|𝑥) ≥ UG(~ pledge|𝑥) and the local group ~ 
pledge when EUG(pledge|𝑥) ≥ EUG(~ pledge|𝑥).  These are simultaneously true when: 
𝑥(𝑣 + 𝜎) ≥ 𝑐 + 𝛽𝛼 ≥ 𝑥(𝑣 + 𝜎) 
which is true by assumption, as 𝑥 > 𝑥 
 
 Because types of G perfectly separate, A posterior beliefs are Φ′ = 1 if G pledges and Φ′ 
= 0 if G ~ pledge.  A will thus support if EUA(support | pledge) ≥ EUA(~support | pledge): 
𝜋𝑥(𝜌 + 𝑣 + 𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑘 ≥ 𝜋𝑥(𝑝 + 𝑣) 
which is true when: 
𝑘 + 𝛽𝛼 ≤  𝜋𝑥(𝜎) 
 A will ~ support a local group such that EUA(~support | ~pledge) ≥ EUA(support | 
~pledge), or: 
𝜋𝑥(𝜌) ≥ 𝜋𝑥(𝑝 + 𝜎) − 𝑘 
which is true when: 
𝑘 ≥  𝜋𝑥(𝜎) 
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Proposition 3: Pooling - All 
Both types of G pledge 
If G pledges, A believes Φ′ =  Φ and supports 
If G ~ pledge, A believes Φ′′ = 1 and ~ supports 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 Beginning with A’s strategy to support when G pledges and ~ support when G ~ pledge.  
When G pledges, A chooses to support when EUA (support | pledge) ≥ EUA (~support | pledge), 
or: 
Φ(πx(ρ + v + σ − βα) − k) + (1 − Φ)(πx(ρ + v + σ − βα) − k)
≥ Φ(πx(ρ + v) + (1 − Φ)(πx(ρ + v)) 
where A’s posterior belief is the same as its prior, Φ′ = Φ.  This inequality is satisfied when: 
Φ ≥  
𝜋𝑥(𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑘
((𝜋𝑥(𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑘) − (𝜋𝑥(𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑘))
 
ensuring Φ between [0,1], 
𝜋𝑥(𝜎) ≥ k + 𝛽𝛼 
 
Next, A ~support when it’s posterior, out of equilibrium belief that G is local is Φ′′, 
meaning EUA (~support | ~pledge) > EUA (support | ~pledge), or: 
Φ′′(πx(ρ) + (1 − Φ′′)(πx(ρ) ≥ Φ′′(πx(ρ + σ) − k) + (1 − Φ′′)(πx(ρ + σ) − k) 
this inequality is satisfied for any out of equilibrium beliefs Φ′′ when: 
Φ′′ ≤
𝜋𝑥(𝜎) − 𝑘




ensuring Φ′′ between [0,1], 
𝜋𝑥(𝜎) > 𝑘 > 𝜋𝑥(𝜎) 
 
 Next, the local type of G will pledge when UG(pledge | 𝑥) ≥ UG(~pledge | 𝑥), or: 
𝑥(𝜌 + 𝑣 + 𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑐 ≥ 𝑥(𝜌) 
 
Lastly, the expanded type of G will pledge when UG(pledge | 𝑥) ≥ UG(~pledge |𝑥), or: 
𝑥(𝜌 + 𝑣 + 𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑐 ≥ 𝑥(𝜌) 
Taken together, these inequalities hold when: 





Proposition 4: Pooling - None 
Both types of G ~pledge 
If G ~ pledge, A believes Φ′ =  Φ and ~supports 
If G pledges, A believes Φ′′ = 1 and supports 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
 Beginning with A’s strategy to ~support when G ~pledge and support when G pledges.  
When G ~pledge, A chooses to ~support when EUA (~support | ~pledge) > EUA (support | 
~pledge), or: 
Φ(π𝑥(ρ)) + (1 − Φ)(π𝑥(ρ)) ≥ Φ(π𝑥(ρ + σ) − k) + (1 − Φ)(π𝑥(ρ + σ) − k) 
where A’s posterior belief is the same as its prior, Φ′ = Φ.  This inequality is satisfied when: 
Φ ≤
𝜋𝑥(𝜎) − 𝑘
(𝜋𝑥(𝜎) − 𝑘) − (𝜋𝑥(𝜎) − 𝑘)
 
ensuring Φ between [0,1], 
𝜋𝑥(𝜎) > 𝑘 > 𝜋𝑥(𝜎) 
 
Next, A support when it’s posterior, out of equilibrium belief that G is expanded is Φ′′, 
meaning EUA (support | pledge) > EUA (~support | pledge), or: 
Φ′′(πx(ρ + v + σ − βα) − k) + (1 − Φ′′)(πx(ρ + v + σ − βα) − k)
≥ Φ′′(πx(ρ + v) + (1 − Φ′′)(πx(ρ + v)) 
this inequality is satisfied for any out of equilibrium beliefs Φ′′ when: 
Φ′′ ≥  
𝜋𝑥(𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑘




ensuring Φ′′ between [0,1], 
𝑘 + 𝛽𝛼 ≥  𝜋𝑥(𝜎) 
 
 Next, the local type of G will pledge when UG(~pledge | 𝑥) ≥ UG(pledge | 𝑥), or: 
𝑥(𝜌) ≥ 𝑥(𝜌 + 𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑐 
 
Lastly, the expanded type of G will pledge when UG(~pledge | 𝑥) ≥ UG(pledge |𝑥), or: 
𝑥(𝜌) ≥ 𝑥(𝜌 + 𝑣 + 𝜎) − 𝛽𝛼) − 𝑐 
Taken together, these inequalities hold when: 





Chapter 4 Appendix 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Military Capacity Governance 
Capacity 
Deny Support Political Terror 
     
Military Expend -0.06* -- -- -- 
 (0.03)    
Tax/GDP -- -0.11* -- -- 
  (0.06)   
Support Denied -- -- -0.50*** -- 
   (0.10)  
PT Score -- -- -- 0.07 
    (0.12) 
Splinter 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.09 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Age 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age2 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Terrorist 0.16* 0.16* 0.21** 0.16* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Alliances 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
War 0.69*** 0.44* 0.67*** 0.70*** 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.21) 
Polity 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
GDPpc 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.11 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Cold War 0.06 -0.17 -0.07 -0.33 
 (1.19) (1.20) (1.15) (1.15) 
9/11 -1.11* -1.36** -1.31** -1.26** 
 (0.67) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) 
Trade -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -3.42 -1.61 -2.37 -3.31 
 (2.62) (2.68) (2.58) (2.63) 
     
Observations 2,752 2,752 2,752 2,724 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Country-Year FE excluded from Table 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES US Troops US Troops 
dummy 
US Aid All Aid 
     
# US Troops -0.08** -- -- -- 
 (0.03)    
US Troops Present -- -0.61* -- -- 
  (0.32)   
US Aid -- -- -0.04*** -- 
   (0.02)  
International Aid -- -- -- -0.01* 
    (0.01) 
Splinter 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Age 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Terrorist 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Alliances 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
War 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.58*** 0.60*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Polity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDPpc 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Population -0.39 -0.43 -0.44 -0.45 
 (1.19) (1.19) (1.17) (1.17) 
Cold War 0.23 0.13 0.19 0.11 
 (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
9/11 -1.06 -1.26 -0.29 -0.84 
 (1.04) (0.82) (0.84) (0.82) 
Trade 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Constant -3.47 -3.78 -3.86 -3.94 
 (2.56) (2.55) (2.54) (2.54) 
     
Observations 2,427 2,427 2,410 2,410 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Country-Year FE excluded from Table 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table B2:  Predicting Affiliation with Intl Costs – Country-Year Fixed Effects  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Military Capacity Governance 
Capacity 
Deny Support Political Terror 
     
Military Expend 0.12* -- -- -- 
 (0.09)    
Tax/GDP -- -0.16** -- -- 
  (0.08)   
Support Denied -- -- -0.53*** -- 
   (0.11)  
PT Score -- -- -- 0.09 
    (0.18) 
Splinter 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Age 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Terrorist 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Alliances 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
War 0.84*** 0.53 0.86*** 0.94*** 
 (0.32) (0.36) (0.31) (0.32) 
Polity 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.09** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
GDPpc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population -0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.36) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Cold War -0.25 -0.24 -0.06 -0.11 
 (1.93) (1.24) (1.20) (1.22) 
9/11 -1.70 -1.43 -1.63 -1.71 
 (1.80) (1.40) (1.38) (1.42) 
Trade -0.02* -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -2.35 -0.20 -1.77 -2.49 
 (4.28) (3.55) (3.46) (3.52) 
     
Observations 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,009 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Country-Year FE excluded from Table 
                                      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 




 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES US Aid All Aid 
   
   
US Aid -0.03** -- 
 (0.02)  
International Aid -- 0.05 
  (0.18) 
Splinter 0.05 0.05 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
Age 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Age2 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Terrorist 0.22** 0.22** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Alliances 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
War 1.08*** 1.00*** 
 (0.31) (0.33) 
Polity 0.08** 0.09** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
GDPpc 0.05 0.03 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
Population -0.32 -0.01 
 (1.23) (1.22) 
Cold War -0.77 -1.61 
 (1.34) (1.33) 
9/11 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -2.75 -2.70 
 (3.44) (3.47) 
   
Observations 2,015 2,015 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Country-Year FE excluded from Table 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 













Chapter 5 Appendix 
 
North v1: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes the Union Budget for Parliament to 
approve.  Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine India’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year India has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Pakistani 
groups working against India’s interests in the Jammu and Kashmir region. 
 
North v2: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes the Union Budget for Parliament to 
approve.  Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine India’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year India has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Indian 
groups working against India’s interests in the Jammu and Kashmir region. 
 
North v3: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes the Union Budget for Parliament to 
approve.  Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine India’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year India has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Pakistani 
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groups teamed with Lashkar-e-Taiba, working against India’s interests in the Jammu and 
Kashmir region. 
 
North v4: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes the Union Budget for Parliament to 
approve.  Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine India’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year India has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Indian 





South India Vignette 1 
 
South v1: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes the Union Budget for Parliament to 
approve.  Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine India’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year India has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Chinese Naxalite 
groups working against India’s interests in the Red Corridor. 
 
South v2: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes the Union Budget for Parliament to 
approve.  Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine India’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year India has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Indian Naxalite 
groups working against India’s interests in the Red Corridor. 
 
South v3: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes the Union Budget for Parliament to 
approve.  Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine India’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year India has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Chinese Naxalite 




South v4: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes the Union Budget for Parliament to 
approve.  Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine India’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year India has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Indian Naxalite 




North Pakistan Vignette 1 
 
North v1: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes a government budget for President to 
approve. Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine Pakistan’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year Pakistan has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Pakistani 
groups working against Pakistan’s interests at the Durand line. 
 
North v2: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes a government budget for President to 
approve. Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine Pakistan’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year Pakistan has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Afghan 
groups working against Pakistan’s interests at the Durand line. 
 
North v3: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes a government budget for President to 
approve. Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine Pakistan’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year Pakistan has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Pakistani 




North v4: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes a government budget for President to 
approve. Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine Pakistan’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year Pakistan has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Afghan 




South Pakistan Vignette 1 
 
South v1: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes a government budget for President to 
approve. Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine Pakistan’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year Pakistan has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Indian 
groups working against Pakistan’s interests in the Jammu and Kashmir region. 
 
South v2: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes a government budget for President to 
approve. Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine Pakistan’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year Pakistan has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Pakistani 




South v3: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes a government budget for President to 
approve. Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine Pakistan’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year Pakistan has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Pakistani 
groups teamed with al-Qaeda working against Pakistan’s interests the Jammu and Kashmir 
region. 
 
South v4: Every year, the Finance Minister proposes a government budget for President to 
approve. Currently, violent political groups have been in the news for undertaking actions, such 
as insurgency campaigns and terrorist attacks, which undermine Pakistan’s interest of promoting 
peace and development around the world.  Accordingly, this year Pakistan has an opportunity to 
alter their current investment amounts in counter-insurgency spending against Islamic Indian 





North India Vignette 2 
 
North v1: A recent proposal calls for the Indian government to cease its “policy of restraint” 
along the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region. As Pakistani security forces and militant 
groups have increased their presence along the LoC, the Indian government has alleged an uptick 
in terrorist attacks. New calls have been made for India to engage militarily along the border in 
response to Pakistani violence.  
 
North v2: A recent proposal, backed by the Indian-based groups working with the Jammu & 
Kashmir Liberation Front, calls for the Indian government to cease its “policy of restraint” along 
the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region. As Pakistani security forces and militant 
groups have increased their presence along the LoC, the Indian government has alleged an uptick 
in terrorist attacks. New calls have been made for India to engage militarily along the border in 
response to Pakistani violence.  
 
North v3: A recent proposal, backed by the Indian-based groups working with the Jammu & 
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), calls for the Indian government to cease its “policy of 
restraint” along the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region. These groups have ethnic ties 
to JKLF. As Pakistani security forces and militant groups have increased their presence along the 
LoC, the Indian government has alleged an uptick in terrorist attacks. New calls have been made 




North v4: A recent proposal, backed by the Indian-based groups working with the Jammu & 
Kashmir Liberation Front, calls for the Indian government to cease its “policy of restraint” along 
the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region. As Pakistani security forces and militant 
groups have increased their presence along the LoC, the Indian government has alleged an uptick 
in terrorist attacks. New calls have been made for India to engage militarily along the border in 
response to Pakistani violence. The groups working with the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front 
could face negative and violent reactions from the government because of their affiliation, but 





South India Vignette 2 
 
South v1: A recent proposal, known as the “Integrated Action Plan” calls for the re-integration of 
leftist Indian parties into India’s democratic society.  These leftist parties have violently sought 
to overthrow the government in the Red Corridor region of India for many years. New calls have 
been made to engage with these parties, offering economic development tools, to prevent further 
violence. 
 
South v2: A recent proposal, backed by some groups working with the Communist Party of India 
– Maoist, known as the “Integrated Action Plan” calls for the re-integration of leftist Indian 
parties into India’s democratic society.  These leftist parties have violently sought to overthrow 
the government in the Red Corridor region of India for many years. New calls have been made to 
engage with these parties, offering economic development tools, to prevent further violence. 
 
South v3: A recent proposal, backed by some groups working with the Communist Party of India 
– Maoist (CPI-M), known as the “Integrated Action Plan” calls for the re-integration of leftist 
Indian parties into India’s democratic society.  These groups have ethnic ties to the CPI-M.  The 
leftist parties have violently sought to overthrow the government in the Red Corridor region of 
India for many years. New calls have been made to engage with these parties, offering economic 
development tools, to prevent further violence. 
 
South v4: A recent proposal, backed by some groups working with the Communist Party of India 
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– Maoist, known as the “Integrated Action Plan” calls for the re-integration of leftist Indian 
parties into India’s democratic society.  The leftist parties have violently sought to overthrow the 
government in the Red Corridor region of India for many years. New calls have been made to 
engage with these parties, offering economic development tools, to prevent further 
violence.  These groups working with the Communist Party of India – Maoist may face could 
face negative and violent reactions from the government because of their affiliation, but continue 




North Pakistan Vignette 2 
North v1: A recent proposal has explored using peace jirgas to resolve disputes along the Durand 
line.  As security forces have increased their presence along the Durand line, the Pakistani 
government has alleged an increase in terrorism attacks.  New calls have been made for the 
Pakistanis to engage in peace jirgas.  
 
North v2: A recent proposal backed by the Pakistani-based groups working with al-Qaeda has 
explored using peace jirgas to resolve disputes along the Durand line.  As security forces have 
increased their presence along the Durand line, the Pakistani government has alleged an increase 
in terrorism attacks.  New calls have been made for the Pakistanis to engage in peace jirgas.  
 
North v3: A recent proposal backed by the Pakistani-based groups working with al-Qaeda has 
explored using peace jirgas to resolve disputes along the Durand line.  These groups have ethnic 
ties to the region. As security forces have increased their presence along the Durand line, the 
Pakistani government has alleged an increase in terrorism attacks.  New calls have been made for 




North v4: A recent proposal backed by the Pakistani-based groups working with al-Qaeda has 
explored using peace jirgas to resolve disputes along the Durand line.   As security forces have 
increased their presence along the Durand line, the Pakistani government has alleged an increase 
in terrorism attacks.  New calls have been made for the Pakistanis to engage in peace jirgas. The 
groups working with al-Qaeda could face negative and violent reactions from the 




South Pakistan Vignette 2 
South v1: A recent proposal calls for the Pakistani government to cease its “policy of restraint” 
along the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region. As Indian security forces and militant 
groups have increased their presence along the LoC, the Pakistani government has alleged an 
uptick in terrorist attacks. New calls have been made for Pakistan to engage militarily along the 
border in response to Indian violence.  
 
South v2: A recent proposal backed by the Pakistan-based groups working with Kashmiri 
tanzeems calls for the Pakistani government to cease its “policy of restraint” along the Line of 
Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region. As Indian security forces and militant groups have 
increased their presence along the LoC, the Pakistani government has alleged an uptick in 
terrorist attacks. New calls have been made for Pakistan to engage militarily along the border in 
response to Indian violence. 
 
South v3: A recent proposal backed by the Pakistan-based groups working with Kashmiri 
tanzeems calls for the Pakistani government to cease its “policy of restraint” along the Line of 
Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region. These groups have ethnic ties to the region.  As Indian 
security forces and militant groups have increased their presence along the LoC, the 
Pakistani government has alleged an uptick in terrorist attacks. New calls have been made for 
Pakistan to engage militarily along the border in response to Indian violence.  
 
South v4: A recent proposal backed by the Pakistan-based groups working with Kashmiri 
tanzeems calls for the Pakistani government to cease its “policy of restraint” along the Line of 
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Control (LoC) in the Kashmir region. As Indian security forces and militant groups have 
increased their presence along the LoC, the Pakistani government has alleged an uptick in 
terrorist attacks. New calls have been made for Pakistan to engage militarily along the border in 
response to Indian violence. The groups working with the Kashmiri tanzeems could face 
negative and violent reactions from the government because of their affiliation, but continue to 






What is your age in years? 
• 18 to 34 years    
• 35 to 54 years    
• 55 years or older    
 
What is your sex? 
• Male    
• Female    
• Prefer not to say    
 
What is the highest class you completed? 
• Primary    
• Secondary    
• University    
• Graduate (Masters or PhD)    
 
Are you married? 
• Yes    
• No    
 
Were you born in India? 
• Yes    
• No    
 
Do you currently live in India? 
• Yes    
• No    
 
In what State do you live? 
 
▼ Andaman and Nicobar Islands  ... West Bengal (36) 
 






What language did you grow up speaking? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you have a religious preference? 
• Islam    
• Hindu    
• Christian    
• Bhuddism    
• Other    
 
How would you describe your financial situation compared to last year at this time? 
• Much better    
• Somewhat better    
• About the same    
• Somewhat worse    




Where do you fall on the political spectrum? 
• Left (Liberal)    
• Center-Left    
• Center    
• Center-Right    




How important is a democratically elected government to you? 
• Not at all important    
• Slightly important    
• Important    
• Fairly important    
• Very important    
 
How do you feel about the United States’ involvement in your government's politics? 
• Extremely appropriate    
• Somewhat appropriate    
• Neither appropriate nor inappropriate    
• Somewhat inappropriate    




Chapter 6 Appendix 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) 
VARIABLES Attacks Attacks Suicide Suicide 
     
# Pledge 1.06**  0.88**  
 (0.03)  (0.06)  
∆ Pledge  1.00  0.97 
  (0.08)  (0.20) 
Pledge 0.83 1.62*** 0.10*** 2.12*** 
 (0.32) (0.17) (0.08) (0.41) 
Pledge * # Pledge 1.05  1.27***  
 (0.03)  (0.08)  
Pledge * ∆ Pledge   1.15  1.14 
  (0.10)  (0.24) 
ln(GDP) 1.00** 1.00** 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ln(Population) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regime Change 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.76 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.14) 
Civil War 2.19*** 2.15*** 3.30*** 3.19*** 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.78) (0.75) 
Size 1.92*** 1.64*** 2.36* 1.28 
 (0.29) (0.25) (1.12) (0.58) 
Public Goods 2.47*** 3.62*** 10.62 23.57*** 
 (0.63) (0.90) (15.49) (27.32) 
Reputation 0.92 1.01 0.54 0.66 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.22) (0.25) 
Overall Yearly Attacks 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00** 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age 0.81*** 0.85*** 0.86** 0.89 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age2 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 1.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Alliance 0.93*** 0.88*** 0.78*** 0.72*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) 
Competition 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) 
ISIS 3.52*** 2.94*** 5.79 3.54 
 (1.08) (0.93) (7.37) (4.51) 
Regime (Anocracy) 1.26 1.21 1.11 1.26 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.41) (0.49) 
Regime (Democracy) 1.38* 1.25 1.38 1.19 
 (0.27) (0.24) (0.63) (0.56) 
Constant 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.24 0.18* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.30) (0.17) 
     
Observations 2,642 2,648 2,214 2,216 
     
Negative Binomial with fixed effects 
Yearly robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





 (A5) (A6) (A7) (A8) 
VARIABLES Type Type Target Target 
     
# Pledge 1.06  1.09  
 (0.07)  (0.06)  
∆ Pledge  0.95  0.89 
  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Pledge 0.36 2.50*** 0.53 2.22** 
 (0.26) (0.80) (0.33) (0.78) 
Pledge * # Pledge 1.21***  1.15***  
 (0.07)  (0.06)  
Pledge * ∆ Pledge   1.25*  1.25** 
  (0.15)  (0.14) 
ln(GDP) 1.00* 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ln(Population) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regime Change 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
Civil War 2.92** 2.54** 2.64*** 2.39** 
 (1.28) (1.12) (0.96) (0.91) 
Size 2.85** 3.03** 3.13** 3.28** 
 (1.49) (1.67) (1.61) (1.76) 
Public Goods 2.14 1.83 1.41 1.27 
 (2.29) (2.13) (1.26) (1.27) 
Reputation 0.51* 0.66 0.52* 0.63 
 (0.19) (0.26) (0.19) (0.24) 
Overall Yearly Attacks 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.87 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) 
Age2 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Alliance 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.93 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Competition 0.86* 0.87 0.89 0.89 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
ISIS 2.32 1.76 1.72 1.89 
 (1.34) (1.19) (0.87) (1.18) 
Regime (Anocracy) 1.18 1.40 1.30 1.50 
 (0.53) (0.59) (0.51) (0.54) 
Regime (Democracy) 1.15 1.37 1.34 1.56 
 (0.43) (0.52) (0.53) (0.64) 
     
Observations 2,650 2,656 2,650 2,656 
     
Ordered Logit with fixed effects 
Yearly robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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